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1. Introduction 
 
A relationship between CEO’s compensation and firm’s performance has been an enormously 
popular research topic and empirical evidence about pay for performance, i.e. about a 
relationship between CEO’s compensation and firm’s performance, has been contradictory. 
Many kinds of issues have argued to explain these differences. For example, a structure of 
compensation package (e.g. Mehran 1995), social ties between directors and board members 
(e.g. Hwang and Kim 2009) and many kinds of industry-specific characteristics (e.g. Mayers 
and Smith 2010) have had significant effects in many papers. One of the most common 
explanation has been corporate governance policies (e.g. Core et al. 1999, Fahlenbrach 2009, 
Hwang and Kim 2009, Conyon and He 2011). 
After the financial crisis of 2007-2008, corporate governance policies have got a huge amount 
of publicity, there have been new legislations related to it and according to some researches 
(e.g. Murphy 2012, Kaplan 2013), companies have improved their corporate governance 
policies as boards have become more powerful and independent. Furthermore, goals of new 
legislations seem to be quite consistent with academic evidence about effective corporate 
governance policies1. However, the prior literature from the past few decades (e.g. Core et al. 
1999, Hwang and Kim 2009 and Conyon and He 2011) has shown that corporate governance 
policies have stayed an important factor behind differences of pay for performance relationship, 
regardless of new legislations and other changes. Therefore, the current situation offers an 
interesting opportunity to study corporate governance policies, the pay for performance 
relationship and the link between these two issues, especially given the financial crisis of 2007-
2008 and its consequences, most importantly followed new legislations. Based on all that, the 
first research question of this paper is the following:  
Research question 1: “Have U.S. companies taken more effective corporate governance 
policies after the year 2009?” 
Based on a majority of prior literature, which has argued that corporate governance policies 
have stayed an important factor behind differences of companies’ operational performance and 
                                                     
1 This means that goals and purposes of new legislations are often consistent with academic findings. For 
example, many academic studies have shown that an independence of board is an important issue for power of 
boards and the primary objective of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) was to increase the boards’ independence. 
 2 
effectivity of compensation policies2 (e.g. Core et al. 1999, Gompers et al. 2003, Farber 2005, 
Ozkan 2007, Firth et al. 2007, Larcker et al. 2007, Hwang and Kim 2009, Conyon and He 2011, 
De Angelis and Grinstein 2011 and Schultz 2013), I expect that corporate governance policies 
have stayed relatively similar pre- and post-crisis of 2007-2008. However, given that some 
papers (e.g. Murphy 2012 and Kaplan 2013) have argued without comprehensive empirical 
evidence that companies have taken more effective corporate governance policies, this is an 
interesting opportunity to study this issue. Based on the prior literature, my first hypothesis is 
the following: 
Hypothesis 1: “U.S. companies have not taken more effective corporate governance policies 
after the year 2009” 
A second interesting research topic is the link between corporate governance policies and pay 
for performance relationship. Many papers (e.g. Core et al. 1999, Gompers et al. 2003, Farber 
2005, and Larcker et al. 2007) have found that companies with more effective corporate 
governance policies tend to have better operational performance. Moreover, regulators’ 
objectives seem to be consistent with academic findings regarding of principles of effective 
corporate governance policies, so one could expect that companies have taken more 
homogenous corporate governance policies. If this would be the case as e.g. Murphy (2012) 
and Kaplan (2013) have claimed, there would be an interesting opportunity to find new 
evidence from the link between corporate governance policies and pay for performance 
relationship. More closely, if the corporate governance policies would have become more 
homogenous, these variables could have smaller amount of explanatory power in pay for 
performance regression models. This is because when a variable has a smaller variance (i.e. 
tighter distribution), the coefficient has a higher variance, which leads to the smaller p-value 
i.e. smaller significance of that coefficient (e.g. Stock and Watson 2007). 
Based on prior findings about corporate governance policies and pay for performance 
relationship, there are many kinds of interesting findings related to this strong link. 
Furthermore, to my best knowledge, there seems to be no comprehensive study that examines 
how some shock (in this case, the financial of 2007-2008 and its consequences e.g. new 
legislations) effects to the alleged strong link between corporate governance policies and the 
pay for performance: Is the link still as strong as before the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and 
                                                     
2 In this paper, an effective compensation policies mean that CEO’s interests are consistent with the 
shareholders’ interests 
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its consequences? How the alleged improvements of corporate governance policies have 
affected to this link? Based on all these, the second research question of this paper is the 
following:  
Research question 2: “Do corporate governance variables have a smaller amount of 
explanatory power in pay for performance regression models after the year 2009?”  
Given the prior literature, which has shown that corporate governance policies have stayed an 
important factor behind differences of companies’ operational performance and effectivity of 
compensation policies, I expect that corporate governance policies can still partially explain 
differences of pay for performance relationship. However, if Murphy (201) and Kaplan (2013) 
would be correct and companies would have improved corporate governance policies, there 
would be an interesting opportunity to find more information about the strong link between 
corporate governance policies and pay for performance relationship. Based on all these, the 
second hypothesis of this paper is the following:  
Hypothesis 2: “Corporate governance variables do not have a smaller amount of explanatory 
power in pay for performance regression models after the year 2009” 
A third interesting research topic is a level of pay for performance relationship, as 
a prior literature has argued that companies with less effective corporate governance policies 
tend to have i) lower operational performance (e.g. Core et al. 1999, Gompers et al. 2003, Farber 
2005, Larcker et al. 2007) and ii) less effective compensation policies (e.g. Ozkan 2007, Firth 
et al. 2007, De Angelis and Grinstein 2011 and Schultz 2013). In fact, Core et al. (1999), Hwang 
and Kim (2009), Fahlenbrach (2009) and Conyon and He (2011) have argued that companies 
with weaker corporate governance policies (i.e. weaker and less effective boards) tend to have 
quite poor pay for performance relationship. 
Based on that, it is interesting to study what changes, if any, there have been in the pay for 
performance relationship after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and its consequences. If the 
corporate governance policies have become more effective, as e.g. Murphy (2012) and Kaplan 
(2013) have argued, the pay for performance relationship should be stronger, based on prior 
literature. This is because for example, Core et al. (1999), Hwang and Kim (2009), Fahlenbrach 
(2009) and Conyon and He (2011) have highlighted importance of corporate governance 
policies behind stronger pay for performance relationship. In other words, they have argued 
that quite often, companies with less effective corporate governance policies tend to have 
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weaker pay for performance relationship. However, the recent changes of corporate governance 
policies are only alleged, given that the prior literature (e.g. Murphy 2012 and Kaplan 2013) 
have not offered comprehensive empirical evidence. Therefore, the current situation offers an 
interesting opportunity to study the level of pay for performance relationship. Interestingly, 
there is no paper, which offers empirical evidence about this important issue with appropriate 
control variables after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and its consequences, so the third 
research question of this paper is the following:  
Research question 3: “Is a level of pay for performance relationship stronger after the year 
2009?” 
Given prior literature, which has found that corporate governance policies have stayed an 
important factor behind differences of companies’ operational performance and effectivity of 
compensation policies and because there is no empirical evidence about improved corporate 
governance policies, there is no supportive arguments for stronger pay for performance 
relationship after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. However, given that some papers (Murphy 
2012 and Kaplan 2013) have argued that companies have improved their corporate governance 
policies, this is an interesting opportunity to study this issue. Therefore, the third hypothesis of 
this paper is the following: 
Hypothesis 3: “A level of pay for performance relationship is not stronger after the year 2009” 
The first contribution of this paper is to offer empirical evidence about corporate governance 
policies after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and its consequences (the first research question): 
Does the empirical evidence of this paper offer supporting evidence for researches (e.g. Murphy 
2012, Kaplan 2013), who have argued that companies have taken more effective corporate 
governance policies after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and its consequences? Does it seem 
that new legislations have achieved their goals, for example more independent boards? 
The second contribution of this paper is to offer new evidence about the pay for performance 
relationship (the third research questions): Is the pay for performance relationship stronger after 
the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and its consequences? Has the large amount of public 
discussions, new regulations etc. pressured boards to monitor compensation more closely? 
The third contribution of this paper is to offer some new evidence about the alleged strong link 
between these two issues. More closely, my purpose is to offer some evidence about the 
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potential changes of the level of pay for performance relationship, given the alleged changes of 
corporate governance policies. If one (in this case corporate governance policies) has changed 
in some way, what has happened to the other one (in this case the pay for performance 
relationship)? Is the relationship between these two still as strong (the second research 
question)? These kinds of questions can be answered (to a certain extent, of course) based on 
my three research questions. 
A figure 1 below presents eight alternative results (cases a-h) that I could get based on my three 
hypotheses i.e. all hypothesis will be rejected or not rejected, 1 of 3 will be rejected (could be 
1, 2 or 3), or 2 of 3 will be rejected (could be 1&2, 1&3 or 2&3). These eight alternative results 
would offer some interesting information about corporate governance policies, the pay for 
performance relationship and the link between these two issues in the U.S. after the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008. A comprehensive description about these different cases and my 
interpretations can be found from the chapter 2.4.  
 
Figure 1. Summary of alternative findings. 
This figure summarizes my hypotheses and key research ideas of this paper. A prior literature has argued that 
corporate governance policies are an important factor behind stronger pay for performance relationship and offered 
some evidence about the link between these two issues. Therefore, given current discussions about effectivity of 
corporate governance policies, new legislations and some articles about improved corporate governance policies 
(e.g. Murphy 2012 and Kaplan 2013), this is an interesting opportunity to study these issues after changed 
environment. In this paper, I study i) the alleged changes of corporate governance policies (hypothesis 1), ii) the 
level of pay for performance (hypothesis 3) and iii) the link between these two issues (hypothesis 2). 
To analyze these three hypotheses, I use corporate governance data from BoardEx, firm’s 
performance and CEO’s compensation data from Compustat and run six different linear 
multiple regression models. I study differences between the period before the crisis and 
Not 
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Not 
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Rejected Case h
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Interpretation 
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followed new legislations (2006-2009) and the period after the crisis and followed new 
legislations (2010-2013). To answer to the first research question, I compare average values of 
corporate governance variables (e.g. average size of the board) pre- and post-crisis and evaluate 
if there are some significant differences by calculating unpaired sample t-values for the 
hypothesis that two means are equal. To answer to the second research question, I analyze 
statistical and economic significance of corporate governance variables in pay for performance 
regression models and evaluate if there are some significance differences between the pre- and 
post-crisis data.  
To answer to the third research question, I analyze statistical and economic significance of my 
performance variables in pay for performance regression models and evaluate if there are some 
significant differences between the pre- and post-crisis data. I follow a prior literature, 
especially famous paper by Core et al. (1999), and use many control variables related to CEO’s 
and firm’s characteristics. I evaluate overall quality of my models by using adjusted r-squared 
and by analyzing the significance of variables in my models. I follow prior literature and use 
the return on assets (ROA) my main performance measurement. In addition, I make a 
robustness checks by using alternative variables, such as another performance measurement, a 
stock return. 
In the next chapter, I present a literature review from this area and theories behind my research 
questions and hypotheses. In the third chapter, I explain the reasoning behind my methodology 
and describe the data and variables. The chapter four includes my results and chapter five 
robustness checks and discussion about findings and limitations. The last chapter concludes. 
2. Prior literature 
 
In this chapter, I present prior findings about pay for performance relationships and importance 
of corporate governance policies behind a stronger pay for performance relationship. In 
addition, I present recent developments of corporate governance related legislations in the U.S.  
and explain why these new regulations are interesting from point of views of i)  
corporate governance policies and ii) the pay for performance relationship. Lastly, I present 
theories behind my research questions and hypotheses and explain what kinds of evidence I 
could get. 
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2.1 The pay for performance: The relationship between CEO’s compensation and firm’s 
performance  
 
The relationship between CEO’s compensation and firm’s performance has been an 
enormously popular research topic. There exist quite a strong consensus regarding of the agency 
problem theory and the general idea that managements should be compensated based on their 
company’s performance (e.g. Jensen& Meckling 1976) but the empirical evidence regarding of 
the relationship between CEO’s compensation and firm’s performance (i.e. pay for 
performance) has been contradictory. For example, Conyon and He (2009) have found that 
there exists a significant relationship between level of CEO’s total compensation and firm’s 
performance but Banker et al. (2012) have argued the opposite, a negative relationship between 
these two issues. More closely, Banker et al. (2012) have argued that companies, which pay 
higher compensation to the CEOs, have negative short-term abnormal returns.  
Interestingly, a level of observed pay for performance relationship has varied enormously 
depending on models and variables. For example, Jensen and Murphy (1990) have found that 
a pay for performance elasticity is 0.325 %, i.e. when shareholders’ wealth increases 1000 
dollars, the CEO compensation increases 3.25 dollars. More recently, many researches have 
argued that this elasticity is significantly stronger. For example, Hall and Liebman (1998) have 
argued that the pay for performance elasticity is about 1.3%, Aggarwal, and Samwick (1999) 
that it is much larger, 14.52%. With a more recent data, the same researches (Aggarwal and 
Samwick 2003) made a very strong statement and claimed that the pay for performance 
elasticity for the CEO can be as high as from 42% to 58% in some cases. Very contractive 
results have presented by Duffhues and Kabir (2008), who have argued that the pay for 
performance relationship can be even negative (i.e. when shareholders’ wealth increase, CEO’s 
compensation decreases). Lastly, Ozkan (2007) has used a more recent data and found that the 
pay for performance elasticity is about 1 % in the U.S. 
Given that a range for pay for performance elasticity has varied from negative values to almost 
60 %, discussions about appropriate level of CEO’s compensation have been active for decades. 
For example, Murphy (1986) has argued that executive compensations encourage managers to 
put in their best effort and because of this, large compensation packages do not necessarily be 
a problem. However, Holmström (1979) has argued that lack of information can decrease 
quality of contracts. Therefore, it seems that appropriate structure of compensation policies is 
one key issue to consider. For example, Mehran (1995) has argued that if a structure of 
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compensation package is a good enough, high compensations are not problematic because these 
packages are good way to align interest of the CEO with shareholders. For example, Bebchuk 
and Fried (2004) have presented the opposite view and argued that CEO’s compensation 
packages fail too often because boards are not powerful and independent enough. However, 
Gabaix and Landier (2006) have criticized Bebchuk and Fried (2004) and argued that between 
1980 and 2003 the most significant reason for a huge increase of average CEO’s compensation 
was a huge increase in market capitalization of large U.S. companies. To summarize this 
discussion, there is no consensus about appropriate level of compensation policies. Moreover, 
there is a disagreement about if compensation policies are appropriate ways to mitigate agency 
problem or if there is too large amount of managerial power for that being possible. 
In addition to the level of compensation, another active topic of discussions has been about 
reasons behind differences of pay for performance elasticity. As the elasticity tends to vary 
largely depending on the data and models, many papers have tried to explain what factors could 
partially explain these differences. For example, Mehran (1995) has argued that a structure of 
compensation package is a very important issue, and Hwang and Kim (2009) that social ties 
between directors and board members can have an explanatory power in pay for performance 
regressions. Many papers, which have often focused on some industry, have argued that there 
exist different kinds of industry specific characteristics that can partially explain the differences 
in pay for performance relationship (e.g. Mayers and Smith 2010). In addition, e.g. Lubatkin et 
al. (2005) have argued that cultural differences can have significant effects because for 
example, the traditional agency theory does not fit very well in the Nordic countries and that 
should be considered. Even though there are large amount of theories that tries to explain 
differences of pay for performance relationship, probably one of the most common explanation 
has been corporate governance policies. 
2.2 Pay for performance relationship and corporate governance policies 
 
Based on many papers (e.g. Core et al. 1999, Hwang and Kim 2009, Fahlenbrach 2009, Conyon 
and He 2011), one of the most significant factors behind differences of pay for performance 
relationship has been corporate governance policies. These papers have offered further 
evidence that this happens because of two reasons. First, companies with more effective 
corporate governance policies tend to have more effective compensation policies for the CEO 
(e.g. Ozkan 2007, Firth et al. 2007, De Angelis and Grinstein 2011, Schultz 2013) and second, 
their operational performance tends to be better (e.g. Core et al. 1999, Gompers et al. 2003, 
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Farber 2005, Larcker et al. 2007). In fact, Cornett et al. (2007) have argued that effective 
corporate governance policies may be even more important factor for a strong link between 
CEO’s compensation and firm’s performance than existence of incentive based compensation, 
which many researches have argued to be a key thing (e.g. Mehran 1995). 
Furthermore, researches seems to have quite consistent views about effective corporate 
governance policies and according to them, there should be certain characteristics of the board 
structure (relatively small size of board, non-CEO chair of board, independence etc.) and board 
members (not too busy nor too old directors etc.). Interestingly, many papers have argued that 
if corporate governance policies are less effective, CEO’s compensation is less sensitive for 
performance of the company, i.e. the pay for performance relationship is weaker (e.g. Core et 
al. 1999, Hwang and Kim 2009, Fahlenbrach 2009, Conyon and He 2011). 
Probably the most cited paper of this area is done by Core et al. (1999), who found that firms 
with less effective corporate governance policies face larger agency problems and that these 
companies tend to have both lower stock returns (indicating smaller performance) and higher 
CEO’s compensation. Obviously, these companies have smaller pay for performance 
relationship and according to this paper, there are many significant corporate governance 
variables, which can partially explain a variation in pay for performance relationship. These 
variables can be divided into two categories, a structure of board (small size, non-CEO chair of 
board, independence) and the characteristics of board members, (not too busy or too old 
directors). Core et al. (1999) found that their eight corporate governance variables were all able 
to partially explain differences in pay for performance relationship (i.e. explain some parts of 
combination of high compensation and bad or average performance).  
After Core et al. (1999), many researchers have found similar kinds of results. Larcker et al. 
(2007) have found that corporate governance structures are related to firms’ future operating 
performance and excess stock returns. Conyon and He (2009) have argued that firms with more 
independent board have stronger pay for performance relationship both in China and in the U.S. 
Fahlenbrach (2009) has found that corporate governance policies can mitigate agency problem 
and increase pay for performance sensitivity. Hwang and Kim (2009) have found that many 
corporate governance variables are significant factors behind differences of pay for 
performance relationship even though other significant factors (like for example other 
directors’ compensation) exist. To summarize, these papers argue that corporate governance 
policies affect to pay for performance relationship and quite often, also to performance of the 
 10 
company. 
Furthermore, after famous paper by Core et al. (1999), there have been some inclusions to 
effective corporate governance policies. Probably the most important finding is related to a 
gender diversity of board of directors. Even though it is not clear if a larger percentage of female 
members of board has a significant impact to effectivity of board, some researchers and politics 
have argued that boardroom gender diversity could have many positive consequences. For 
example, Adams and Ferreira (2009) have argued that gender diversity may lead to higher 
attendance rate of board meetings. Furthermore, Harriet Harman (UK labor party member) has 
argued that female members can have an important role in risk management. In here famous 
line, she has stated that the financial crisis of 2007-2008 would have been significantly smaller 
if the Lehman Brothers had been “Lehman Sisters” (Morris 2009). In addition, Michel Barnier 
(EU commissioner) has said that female members can help board to obtain more group thinking, 
which could help to prevent large crisis (Treanor 2011). Based on these kinds of findings and 
arguments, a percentage of the female members should be considered in corporate governance 
analysis.  
As the previous examples show, the discussion about importance of corporate governance 
policies has been relatively active for decades. Given this, one may wonder how it is possible 
that there have been so many large accounting scandals in the U.S. (e.g. Enron 2001, World 
com 2002, American Insurance group 2005). According to many researches, ineffective 
legislations have been a very important factor behind both the accounting scandals and more 
recent crisis, the financial crisis of 2007-2008. For example, Sun et al. (2011) have argued that 
new legislations after the accounting scandals, such as the Public Company Accounting Reform 
and the Investor Protection Act of 2002, were not effective enough and a failure of corporate 
governance policies, especially a failure of risk management, was a very significant factor 
behind the financial crisis of 2007-2008. However, other researches have argued that legislation 
can have many kinds of positive effects. For example, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) have 
argued that new legislations after the accounting scandals had a positive effect to CEO’s 
compensation because interests between shareholders and management were better aligned.  
Based on these contractive findings about effectivity of new legislation, one could think that a 
structure of legislation is a highly important issue because legislation should have not only 
appropriate goals but also appropriate ways to seek these goals. For example, Adams and 
Ferreira (2007) have offered supportive evidence for this view and highlighted that 
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inappropriate disclosure practices are one issue that can prevent legislations to achieve its 
objectives. However, there might be challenges that are even more important because 
inappropriate legislations might have even the opposite than desired effect. For example, 
Adams and Ferreira (2007) have warned that larger amount of legislation might get board 
members to think that they do not have to understand every risk included in some deal, because 
legislation takes cares of that. 
Similar kinds of challenges can be found from an internal corporate governance policies3 point 
of view. For example, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) have argued that CEO’s compensation 
packages can be a part of the agency problem because boards may have more incentives to 
favor CEO than the shareholders. Later (2010) Bebchuk and Fried have found another problem 
and argued that the CEO can try to manipulate compensation package measures (e.g. ROA or 
stock return). To summarize this discussion, both internal and external corporate governance 
policies are important for stronger pay for performance relationship, but both also include many 
kinds of challenges. 
 2.3 Relevant legislation changes after the financial crisis in the U.S. 
After the financial crisis of 2007-2008, there have been large number of new legislations related 
to corporate governance. Even though I do not expect any significant changes to corporate 
governance policies, there are some arguments and theories about why there could be some 
changes and why this is an interesting opportunity to get more information about corporate 
governance policies and pay for performance relationship. First, I present some findings and 
theories about why one could assume that companies would have improved their corporate 
governance policies after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. After that, I present some theories 
about why those changes may have had some effects to pay for performance relationship as 
well. 
2.3.1 Recent developments from the corporate governance point of view 
 
After the financial crisis of 2007-2008, there have been active discussions about appropriate 
legislation, effective corporate governance policies and importance of these issues. In addition 
to many academic articles, Sun et al. (2011) and Bainbridge (2016) have published 
                                                     
3 Legislation is a significant external factor but companies have a large amount of internal policies to consider, 
such as the size of the boards, committees etc. 
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comprehensive books and the OECD (2009) has made a comprehensive report about the 
corporate governance policies pre-crisis, during the crisis and post-crisis. Many kinds of 
findings have presented in these sources, both for and against new legislations. 
For example, Sun et al. (2011) have argued that quite often, shareholders are not able to monitor 
managers well enough and regulation may help to mitigate this problem, especially in the 
financial sector. Interestingly, they have argued that new legislations have both challenges and 
opportunities. On the one hand, they are a bit pessimist about successfulness of these kinds of 
legislation because they tend to be relatively costly (e.g. they have claimed that the cumulative 
costs of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 to U.S. economy have been 1.4 billion dollars) and because 
of a lack of appropriate level of resources. The latter means that supervisors may not have 
enough financial resources and human capital to monitor all companies, so they should be 
concentrating on the financial sector. However, on the other hand, they admit that regulations 
were one important issue that helped boards to be more effective monitors during the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008 in Japan. 
Regardless of many kinds of critics, there has been a large amount of new legislations, which 
set rules for example to the maximum pay levels and deductibility, severance agreements and 
clay backs. The most important recent legislations are the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act (EESA, 2008), the Obama (2009), the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA, 
2009) and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010, commonly 
referred as the Dodd-Frank act). The first three contains mostly compensation restrictions and 
the last one includes some corporate governance rules (Murphy 2012). Given that the interests 
of this paper are the alleged changes of corporate governance policies, not the law changes 
itself, I do not focus on comprehensive description about the new laws. Instead, I present some 
examples, which support the view that new legislation could have some important effects to 
corporate governance policies.  
Among the new legislations, the Dodd-Frank act probably has got the largest amount of space 
in the public discussion and even though it is mostly focused on the financial sector, it includes 
some parts, which can be very significant issues for effective corporate governance policies of 
all companies. Probably the most important things are so-called say on pay votes, which means 
that all public companies must obtain annual, non-binding advisory shareholders votes on the 
top executive pay. Not surprisingly, there have been discussions about effectivity of this kind 
of voting system. On the one hand, Bebchuk (2007) has argued that say on pay votes leads to 
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more effective compensation policies because they help boards to overcome psychological 
barriers to negotiate with CEO on behalf of the shareholders. On the other hand, e.g. Kaplan 
(2007) and Bainbridge (2008) have claimed that say on pay votes will lead to less effective 
compensation policies because directors will appeal to ill-informed shareholders and take less 
responsibility. Because of that, they have argued that boards should ignore the say on pay votes. 
Given that the Dodd-Frank act and the say on pay votes are relatively new legislations, there 
seems to be no empirical evidence about effectivity of these kinds of regulation in the U.S. 
However, similar kinds of regulations have already taken in the U.K. in 2002 and according to 
Ferri and Maber (2013), these votes have been an effective way to control compensation in the 
U.K. They found that the say on pay votes have been an effective monitoring mechanism, which 
helps shareholders to pressure boards to remote controversial compensation policies and 
increase pay for performance elasticity. This phenomenon was especially strong among firms 
that had excess CEO pay before the regulation. Initially, one might think that based on Ferri 
and Mabers’ (2013) paper, the say on pay votes could have an effect also in the U.S. However, 
pay levels in the U.S are significantly higher and the culture is different, so no straightforward 
conclusion cannot be made without a further analysis and this is an interesting opportunity to 
find new information. 
In addition to a direct obligation, new legislation could affect also via public discussion. For 
example, Wu (2004) has found that the California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(CalPERS), which publicly named companies having poor corporate governance, had and 
significant effect to the corporate governance policies. Wu (2004) offered evidence that after 
named by CalPERS, companies with ineffective corporate governance policies were more 
likely to hire independent board members and have a stronger relation between CEO’s dismissal 
and performance. Given that the new legislations after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 have 
caused a large amount of public discussion and corporate governance policies have got strong 
critics, it could be that these issued combined have caused similar kinds of indirect effects than 
CalPERS did. However, CalPERS and new legislations after the financial crisis (The Dodd-
Frank etc.) are quite a different and no straightforward conclusions can be made without further 
evidence.  
Given these kinds of potential direct (obligation) and indirect (e.g. a public pressure) effects of 
new legislations and quite consistent view about effective corporate governance policies, one 
could argue that companies have faced pressure to improve their corporate governance policies. 
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This is because both internal (shareholders have got more power) and external (public 
discussion because of the financial crisis of 2007-2008) monitoring have become stronger and 
one could expect that companies have taken (or forced to take) more effective corporate 
governance policies. For example, Kaplan (2013) and Murphy (2012) have argued that this is 
exactly what has happened and companies have improved their corporate governance policies, 
as boards are now more powerful and independent. However, there is no empirical evidence 
about improved corporate governance policies and many researches have doubted the 
effectivity of legislations (e.g. Kaplan 2007, Bainbridge 2008, Sun et al 2011). Based on all 
that, the first interest of this paper is to study if companies have taken more effective corporate 
governance policies, as e.g. Murphy (2012) and Kaplan (2013) have argued. The exact proxies 
for effective corporate governance policies are presented in the chapter 3 (corporate governance 
variables). 
2.3.2 Recent developments from the pay for performance point of view 
To my best knowledge, there is no recent empirical evidence about pay for performance 
relationship. This is particularly interesting because of new legislation and a large amount of 
public discussion, which may have had some effects to the pay for performance relationship. 
For example Stathopoulos et al. (2004) have found that the public discussion can moderate the 
compensation of the management to some extent and Murphy (2012) has argued that the 
political regulations are important factors behind compensation policies and because of that, 
political issues should be considered when one is analyzing the pay for performance 
relationship. 
More closely, given that shareholder power may have increased due to say on pay votes and 
other new legislations, firm’s compensation policies could have become more effective. 
Supportive evidence for this view have found by De Angelis and Grinstein (2011), who found 
that CEO compensation packages are less effective if shareholders have smaller amount of 
power. Ferri and Maber (2013) have offered supportive evidence for De Angelis and Grinstein 
(2011) and argued that new regulations may control compensation because of increased 
shareholder power. In addition, Ferri and Maber (2013) have found supportive evidence for 
Stathopoulos et al. (2004) and argued that public discussion may control compensation because 
companies want to avoid negative publicity, which they could get if people think that 
compensation policies are too generous. However, it is not clear if new legislations have been 
effective, so no straightforward conclusions can be made without a further evidence. 
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In addition to these kinds of empirical findings, there is a theoretical reason for why the recent 
legislations may offer an interesting opportunity to find new information about pay for 
performance relationship. Basically, it is the alleged strong statistical link between the corporate 
governance policies and the pay for performance relationship. First, some researchers (e.g. 
Murphy 2012, Kaplan 2013) have claimed (but not offered comprehensive empirical evidence) 
that companies have taken more effective corporate governance policies. Second, given that 
empirical evidence about effective corporate governance and goals of the legislations seems to 
be quite consistent (e.g. outsider members), one could expect more homogenous corporate 
governance policies (e.g. larger amount of boards with high portion of outside members). Third, 
this should mean tighter distributions for corporate governance variables, such as “percentage 
of outside board members”, because there should be a smaller amount of companies with 
ineffective corporate governance policies. Fourth, this should decrease explanatory power of 
these variables in pay for performance regressions because an independent variable can have a 
large amount of explanatory power in a regression model only if a variance of the variable (Xi) 
is relatively large (i.e. distribution is relatively wide)4.  
Based on all that, significant corporate governance coefficients would indicate that either 
corporate governance policies are still relatively ineffective or that corporate governance 
policies are very crucial for the level of pay for performance relationship as even smaller 
differences in corporate governance policies are enough to explain differences in pay for 
performance regressions. Both results would be interesting evidence and answer of the first 
research question could offer some insight about which one seems to be a more appropriate 
interpretation. Based on that, it is possible to get some new evidence about the alleged strong 
link between corporate governance policies and the pay for performance relationship. Either 
this paper would offer some evidence against e.g. Murphy (2012) and Kaplan (2013) or 
supportive evidence for e.g. Core et al. (1999), Hwang and Kim (2009), Fahlenbrach (2009), 
Conyon and He (2011). 
However, if coefficients of corporate governance variables are insignificant, this paper can offer 
results that are even more interesting. In that case, there would be two different situations, 
depending on the answer of the first research question. First, if corporate governance policies 
                                                     
4 This is because a smaller variance of independent variable (Xi) means a larger variance for coefficient of that 
variable (Bi), which means higher p-value for this variable. For a mathematical proof for this, see the appendix 
1. More intuitively, when there is more variation in variable (Xi), there is larger amount of information that one 
can use to fit regression line (e.g. Stock and Watson 2007). 
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have not become more effective but coefficients of corporate governance variables are 
insignificant, this paper would offer some evidence against the alleged strong link between 
corporate governance policies and pay for performance relationship. Second, if corporate 
governance policies have become more effective and coefficients of corporate governance 
variables have become less significant, there is an interesting opportunity to get new 
information about the current level of pay for performance relationship. What factors can now 
explain differences? Is significance of other variables (e.g. size of the company or CEO’s 
tenure) changed? Based on all this, the second interest of the paper is about significance of 
corporate governance variables in pay for performance regression models. 
Given that the prior literature (e.g. Core et al. 1999, Hwang and Kim 2009, Fahlenbrach 2009 
Conyon and He 2011) has argued that corporate governance policies can partially explain 
differences in pay for performance regressions, more effective corporate governance policies 
could mean stronger pay for performance relationship. Alternatively, this paper would offer 
some interesting evidence against the strong link between corporate governance policies and 
pay for performance relationship. Based on all that, it is interesting to study what has happened 
to pay for performance relationship after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. This is the third 
interest of this paper. 
2.4 The research gap 
Interestingly, there seems to be a very limited amount of evidence related to these three interest. 
To my best knowledge, this is the first paper that offers evidence about effects of changed 
environment (the financial crisis of 2007-2008) to the alleged strong link between corporate 
governance policies and pay for performance relationship. Moreover, there seems to be no 
empirical evidence about improvements of corporate governance policies after the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008, even though for example, Murphy (2012) and Kaplan (2013) have argued 
that boards are now more powerful. 
Regarding of the pay for performance relationship, there are some papers that have offered 
some evidence after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 but I argue that those papers have some 
significant limitations and because of those, this paper can offer new, important and interesting 
evidence. To my best knowledge, two papers with similar kinds of pay for performance 
regressions have published after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 so next I argue, why this 
paper has significant contributions to the existing literature regardless of these two papers. I 
 17 
start with Vemala et al. (2014), who have done CEO compensation research in the U.S. after 
financial crisis of 2007-2008. After that, I continue with Alexander and Sherif (2016) who have 
done similar kind of research in the U.K. 
Vemala et al. (2014) have done CEO’s compensation research in the U.S. after the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008, so one could argue that their findings could decrease contributions of my 
paper. However, I argue that there are several reasons for why this is not the case. First, they 
are not interested in changes of corporate governance policies (my first research question) or 
effects of corporate governance policies in pay for performance regressions (my second 
research question). Second, even though they are interested in CEO’s compensation after the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008, I argue that their methodology and more specifically, choices of 
variables, are questionable.  
First, Vemala et al. (2014) did not use any proxy variables for board’s independence, even 
though both regulators and researches seem to highlight importance of independent boards (e.g. 
Barnhart and Rosenstein 1998, Core et al. 1999, Ozkan 2011, Fahlenbrach 2009, Conyon and 
He 2011, Schultz 2013). Second, they did not include any control variable for CEO’s 
stockholding (i.e. incentive control), even though this variable has been significant in many 
other papers (e.g. Core et al. 1999, Coombs et al. 2005, Ozkan 2007). Third, they used Tobin’s 
q as a main performance measure, even though e.g. Core et al. (1999), Coombs et al. (2005), 
Canarella and Nourayi (2008), Duffhues and Kabir (2008) and Conyon and He (2011) have 
argued that accounting based ROA would be a more appropriate proxy and based on my best 
knowledge, it is also more common proxy in this research area. Fourth, they used less common 
proxies for some issues, for example the total assets instead of the sales used by Core et al. 
(1999), Coombs et al. (2005), Brick et al. (2006), Ozkan (2007), Conyon et al. (2011) etc. Fifth, 
they included an unemployment rate without an appropriate theory for this variable and the p-
value for this variable differed from less than 1% to more than 40%, which indicate that this 
might not be an appropriate variable to the models. Based on all these, I argue that even though 
Vemala et al. (2014) got some interesting results, their paper does not decrease the contribution 
of this paper. 
To my best knowledge, the most recent paper of this research area is done by Alexander and 
Sherif (2016), who studied effects of the financial crisis of 2007-2008. However, similarly to 
the Vemala et al. (2014), they were not interested in changes of corporate governance policies 
(my first research question) or effects of corporate governance policies in pay for performance 
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regressions (my second research question). Furthermore, they used data from the U.K., so I 
argue that the results with my data from the U.S. could give different results. This is because 
the overall level of CEO’s compensation tends to be significantly larger in the U.S. (e.g. Conyon 
et al. 2011, Alexander and Serif 2016) and there have been more legislations in the U.S. after 
the financial crisis of 2007-2008, for example the say on pay votes were adopted in the U.S. in 
2010 and in the U.K. in 2002. Moreover, similarly to Vemala et al. (2014), Alexander and 
Sherif (2016) did not use any proxy variables for board independence or CEO’s stockholdings 
and they used slightly less common control variables (e.g. the total assets instead of the sales) 
and performance variable (the Tobin’s q instead of the ROA). Based on these differences, I 
could get very different results and Alexander and Sheriff’s (2016) paper does not decrease the 
contribution of my paper. 
Given that the pay for performance relationship is a common research topic, there are some 
other papers, which have published after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. However, to my best 
knowledge, these two papers presented above have the most similar interest than mine. For 
example, Schultz et al. (2013) have done research related to this area but they have used data 
from 2000-2010 and their point of view is not the financial crisis of 2007-2008, so effects of 
the crisis do not appear in their paper, especially because the Dodd-Frank act was adopted in 
2010.  
To summarize, there seems to be no paper, which offer evidence related to my first or second 
research question. Furthermore, even though there seems to be two paper, which offer evidence 
related to my third research question, these papers have significant limitations. Based on these, 
I argue that there is a significant research gap and that this paper has significant contribution to 
the existing literate. 
2.5 Research questions and hypothesis 
 
In this chapter, I summarize my research questions and develop my hypotheses. Based on the 
prior findings and a research gap, there are three main interest of this paper: 
i) The alleged improvement of corporate governance policies in the U.S. after the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008 and its consequences (e.g. the new legislation), 
ii) The strong link between the corporate governance policies and pay for performance 
relationship (i.e. significance of corporate governance variables in pay for performance 
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regression models) after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 its consequences and  
iii) The level of pay for performance relationship after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 its 
consequences.  
To study these three issues, I have three research questions and three hypotheses. The first 
research question is about the changes of the corporate governance policies in the U.S. after the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
Research question 1: “Have U.S. companies taken more effective corporate governance 
policies after the year 2009?” 
Based on the arguments presented in the previous chapter, most importantly the prior literature 
showing that there exist significant inefficiencies in corporate governance policies as they have 
stayed an important factor behind pay for performance relationship regardless of new 
legislations and other changes, my first hypothesis is the following: 
Hypothesis 1: “U.S. companies have not taken more effective corporate governance policies 
after the year 2009” 
The second research question is about importance of corporate governance variables in pay for 
performance regression models after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and its consequences (i.e. 
about the strong link between corporate governance policies and pay for performance 
relationship). 
Research question 2: “Do corporate governance variables have a smaller amount of 
explanatory power in pay for performance regression models after the year 2009?”  
Based on the arguments presented in the previous chapter, most importantly the prior literature 
showing that corporate governance policies have stayed an important factor behind pay for 
performance relationship regardless of new legislations and other changes, my second 
hypothesis is the following: 
Hypothesis 2: “Corporate governance variables do not have a smaller amount of explanatory 
power in pay for performance regression models after the year 2009” 
The third research question is about the level of pay for performance relationship after the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 and its consequences. 
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Research question 3: “Is a level of pay for performance relationship stronger after the year 
2009?” 
The third hypothesis is based on many papers’ findings regarding of importance of corporate 
governance variables in pay for performance regression models. For example, Core et al. 
(1999), Hwang and Kim (2009), Fahlenbrach (2009), Conyon and He (2011) have argued that 
more effective corporate governance policies tend to be linked to stronger pay for performance 
relationships. Moreover, given the prior literature showing that corporate governance policies 
have stayed an important factor behind pay for performance relationship regardless of new 
legislations and other changes, there is basically no reasons to expect any significant changes 
to the level of pay for performance relationship. 
Hypothesis 3: “A level of pay for performance relationship is not stronger after the year 2009.” 
The prior literature has argued that there exists a strong link between effective corporate 
governance policies (my first and second hypotheses are related to this) and stronger pay for 
performance relationship (my third hypothesis is related to this). However, the prior literature 
has not offered evidence about what would happen to one of these if the other one faces some 
significant change. Is the pay for performance relationship still quite weak? Can smaller 
differences in corporate governance policies still partially explain differences in pay for 
performance relationship? Have there really been some significant changes in corporate 
governance policies? These kinds of questions can be answered based on my three research 
questions, which study changes of corporate governance policies, the link between corporate 
governance policies and pay for performance relationship and potential changes in level of pay 
for performance relationship.  
Given that my hypotheses are independent of each other’s’ (i.e. rejecting one does not affect to 
the others), there are eight potential situations, which all could offer some interesting evidence 
about the current corporate governance policies, the pay for performance relationship and the 
alleged strong relationship between these two after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. The figure 
1 (see page 5) visualized the potential results and next I present comprehensive descriptions 
about what these situations (cases a-h) would mean and why they all would offer some 
interesting information, given findings of prior literature. My hypotheses, which are based on 
the prior literature, argue that the case a should be the most likely case. 
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Case a: Offers evidence that on average, U.S. companies have not taken more effective 
corporate governance policies. Furthermore, this case offers evidence that the strong link 
between corporate governance policies and pay for performance relationship still holds. Lastly, 
this case offers evidence that the pay for performance relationship is still weak. To summarize, 
this case offers evidence that nothing has changed regarding of corporate governance policies, 
the pay for performance relationship or the link between these two. This would be evidence 
against e.g. Murphy (2012) and Kaplan (2013). 
Case b: Offers evidence that on average, U.S. companies have not taken more effective 
corporate governance policies. Secondly, this case offers supportive evidence for the strong 
link between corporate governance policies and pay for performance relationship. More 
interestingly, the pay for performance relationship has become stronger because of some other 
factors than more effective corporate governance policies. 
Case c: Offers evidence that on average, U.S. companies have not taken more effective 
corporate governance policies. Interestingly, this case offers some evidence that the link 
between corporate governance policies and pay for performance relationship is not as strong as 
the prior literature has argued. This is because coefficients of corporate governance variables 
are not significant in pay for performance regressions. In addition, this case shows that the pay 
for performance relationship is still weak. 
Case d: Offers evidence that on average, U.S. companies have not taken more effective 
corporate governance policies. Interestingly, this case offers some evidence that the link 
between corporate governance policies and pay for performance relationship is not as strong as 
the prior literature has argued. This is because coefficients of corporate governance variables 
are not significant in pay for performance regressions. In addition, this case shows that the pay 
for performance relationship has become stronger, even though companies have not taken more 
effective corporate governance policies. 
Case e: Offers evidence that on average, U.S. companies have taken more effective corporate 
governance policies. However, as the corporate governance variables are still significant, there 
are a few different interpretations: i) there are still relatively large amount of companies, which 
have ineffective corporate governance policies or ii) corporate governance policies are very 
crucial for strong pay for performance relationship, as even smaller differences are enough to 
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partially explain differences in pay for performance relationship. Answer to the first research 
question offers some evidence that the second one is more likely explanation but it is difficult 
to say which one, or a combination of both is a more appropriate interpretation. However, this 
would offer some evidence against e.g. Murphy (2012) and Kaplan (2013) because it seems 
that companies have not taken more effective corporate governance policies. In addition, this 
result show that the pay for performance relationship is still weak. 
Case f: Offers evidence that on average, U.S. companies have taken more effective corporate 
governance policies. However, as the corporate governance variables are still significant, there 
are a few different interpretations: i) there are still relatively large amount of companies, which 
have ineffective corporate governance policies or ii) corporate governance policies are very 
crucial for strong pay for performance relationship, as even smaller differences are enough to 
partially explain differences in pay for performance relationship. Answer to the first research 
question offers some evidence that the second one is a more likely explanation but it is difficult 
to say which one, or a combination of both is the appropriate interpretation. However, this 
would offer some evidence against e.g. Murphy (2012) and Kaplan (2013) because it seems 
that companies have not taken more effective corporate governance policies. In addition, this 
result shows that the pay for performance relationship has improved. 
Case g: Offers evidence that on average, U.S. companies have taken more effective corporate 
governance policies. More interestingly offers some evidence against the prior literature (e.g. 
Core et al. 1999, Hwang and Kim 2009, Fahlenbrach 2009, Conyon and He 2011), because 
even though companies have taken more effective corporate governance policies, the pay for 
performance relationship is still as weak as it has been in prior literature. To my knowledge, 
this would be the first paper, which showed that even though corporate governance policies 
have become more effective, the pay for performance relationship has not become stronger.  
Case h: Offers evidence that on average, U.S. companies have taken more effective corporate 
governance policies. Support the findings of the prior literature (e.g. Core et al. 1999, Hwang 
and Kim 2009, Fahlenbrach 2009, Conyon and He 2011), regarding of the significant link 
between corporate governance policies and pay for performance relationship because the pay 
for performance relationship has improved with corporate governance policies. To my best 
knowledge, this would be the first paper, which showed that when corporate governance 
policies have become more effective, the pay for performance relationships has become 
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stronger. 
As one can see from the cases above, this paper has a significant contribution to the existing 
literature because it offers some new evidence about corporate governance policies, the pay for 
performance relationship and the alleged link between these two issues.  
3. Methodology, data and variables 
 
In this chapter, I describe my methodology, variables and arguments behind them. 
3.1 Methodology  
 
To study the first research question, I use an unpaired sample t-test, which is a commonly used 
method to test if difference between two observations is statistically significant. This is a 
commonly accepted method for testing effects of some shock (in this case the financial crisis 
of 2007-2008) and no comprehensive argumentation is needed, as there are not many alternative 
methods for this kind of research question.  
However, there are many potential ways to study the second and the third research questions 
and because the relationship between CEO’s compensation and firm’s performance has been 
an enormously popular research topic, many kinds of methods have used. However, I argue that 
both theory and prior literature support multiple linear regression models and more specifically, 
the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) fitting. First, based on my best knowledge, the OLS fitting is 
the most common research method in this area. Second, there are many theoretical benefits in 
the OLS because under the following assumptions, it is unbiased, consistent and effective 
(Stock and Watson 2007): 
Assumption 1: E(ui|X1i = x1..., Xki = xk = 0). More intuitively, a conditional distribution 
(meaning given all the Xi values) of error term u is zero. In my paper, this assumption means 
that one cannot estimate future returns (ROA or stock return) based on error terms of pay for 
performance regressions. I have no reason to believe that this assumption would not hold 
because most papers of this research area have used similar kinds of models and databases than 
I do. 
Assumptions 2: (X1i,...,Xki,Yi), i =1,...,n, are independent and identically distributed (often 
shortened as i.i.d.). More intuitively, this assumption means that a collection process of 
observations is not biased. Because I collect my data by using simple random sampling (just 
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take all companies that are in both databases), this assumption holds automatically. 
Assumption 3: E(X1
4) <,...,E(Xi4) <…, E(Y4)<. More intuitively, this means that all 
independent (Xi) and dependent (Yi) variables have finite four moments, i.e. large outliers are 
rare. I checked my data and I did not find any clear outliers. 
Assumption 4: There is no perfect multicollinearity. More intuitively, no variable is an exact 
linear function of some other variable. I checked my data and there were no large correlations. 
The exact correlations are presented in the chapter 3.3. 
Because these assumptions seem to hold and based on my best knowledge, the OLS is the most 
common approach for linear multiple regression fitting (both in this area of research and more 
generally in any research that use linear multiple regression models), I argue that the multiple 
linear regression with the OLS fitting is an appropriate way to answer my second and third 
research questions.  
I run six different multiple regression models (three with pre-crisis data and three with post-
crisis data) in Stata and use many control variables that I selected based on the prior literature. 
I evaluate my models based on adjusted r-squared and robustness checks. I use clustered 
standard errors to avoid problems related to the autocorrelation between observations from the 
same company. 
3.2 Databases 
 
I use corporate governance data from BoardEx, firm’s performance and CEO’s compensation 
data from Compustat and run six different linear multiple regression models and evaluate 
validity and reliability of my research by using different kinds of robustness checks (alternative 
models and variables). To maximize number of observations, I include all companies, which 
have information about all variables in the both databases. Following e.g. Core et al. (1999) and 
Fahlenbrach (2009), I drop companies that have some missing information because otherwise 
there might be some problems, such as a biased sample if missing of some data is not a random 
process. I use two different periods, pre-crisis (2006-2009) and post crisis (2009-2013) because 
this paper is interested in effects of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and its consequences, such 
as new legislations.  
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3.3 Variables 
 
In this chapter, I describe my variables, argue why I decided to use these variables and tell what 
kinds of coefficients I expect for each of the variables. Most of my variables and expectations 
are based on probably the most cited paper of this area, Core et al. (1999). I argue that this is 
an appropriate way to choose the variables because the second and the third interests of this 
paper are quite similar than the interests of the paper of Core et al. (1999) and because many 
other papers have used quite similar kinds of variables than I use. However, I add a percentage 
of female board members and make some small adjustment to some of the variables. Next, I 
define each variable and then explain the arguments behind them. 
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Table 1: Definitions of the variables 
 
This table presents definitions of the variables used in this paper. 
 
Variable Definition
Total Compensation Annual total compensation paid to CEO, as reported in annual report
Cash compensation Sum of annual salary and bonus
Salary Annual fixed compensation
ROA Net income/loss divided by total assets
Size Number of directors on board
Duality 1 if CEO is also the chair of the board, 0 otherwise
%Outsiders
Members of board of directors who are not employees of the company divided by total 
number of directors on board
%Aged
Members of board of directors who are older than 69 divided by total number of directors 
on board
Busy
1 if at least 50% of members of board of directors serve on three or more other boards, 0 
otherwise
%Related
Members of board of directors who have been employees of the company but currently are 
not, divided by total number of directors on board
%Females
Members of board of directors who are female divided by total number of directors on 
board
Tenure Number of years the CEO has been CEO
%CEO stocks Stockholding of the CEO (%)
Sales Annual revenue
D/A Total debt divided by total assets
M/B Market value of the company divided by total assets
Stock Return (%) One/three/five year(s) total stock return, dividends re-invested
Total Assets ($ thousands) Total amount of assets owned by company ($ thousands), as reported in balance sheet
%Busy
Members of board of directors who serve on three or more other boards, divided by total 
number of directors on board
CEO age Age of CEO in years
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3.3.1 Compensation variables 
Even though one main interest of this paper is to study the pay for performance relationship 
between firm’s performance and CEO’s total compensation, it is important to separate different 
forms of compensation. This is because according to many papers (e.g. Mehran 1995, Banker 
et al. 2012), a structure of compensation can be an important factor behind pay for performance 
relationship and if one does not study different forms of compensation separately, one might 
not find all relevant information about the pay for performance relationship. For example, 
according to Banker et al. (2012), different forms of compensation may have contrary effects 
and one can get more accurate information about the pay for performance relationship by 
studying the different forms separately. Based on these kinds of findings, I follow a famous 
paper of this research area, Core et al. (1999), and I use three different forms of compensation, 
a total compensation, a cash compensation and a salary.  
Total Compensation: The third research question of this paper is about if there is a stronger 
relationship between this variable and past performance of the company (i.e. ROA or a stock 
return) after the financial crisis of 2007-2008.  
Cash Compensation: Following Core et al. (1999), I study cash compensation because then I 
can separate effects of i) equity-based compensation (i.e. total compensation minus the cash 
compensation) and ii) cash-based compensation. 
Salary: Again, following Core et al. (1999), I use salary as one independent variable. This is 
because I want to study the pay for performance relationship of different kinds of compensation 
and salary represent a fixed annual compensation that has paid to the CEO. 
3.3.2 Performance variables 
 
To my best knowledge, the most common performance measurement in this research area is a 
return on assets (ROA), so I argue that the ROA is an appropriate proxy for performance of 
company. In addition, I make a robustness check by using market-based measurement of 
performance of the company, a stock return. 
Return on Asset (ROA): A large part of the literature, which has focused on realized (i.e. past) 
returns, has used ROA as a main performance measure. For example, Coombs et al. (2005), 
Conyon and He (2011) and Schultz et al. (2013) have found that the ROA is significant at one 
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percent level in similar kinds of regressions. In addition, Canarella and Nourayi (2008) have 
got five percent significance level. Based on the prior findings, I expect statistically and 
economically positive coefficient for this variable, even though Duffhues and Kabir (2008) 
have found very interesting results that the ROA is significantly negative at one percent level 
in similar kind of regression. 
3.3.3 Corporate Governance variables 
 
I use the following proxies for effective corporate governance policies. Most of these variables 
are taken from paper of Core et al. (1999) but I slightly modified some variables based on 
findings that are more recent. In addition, I add one new variable, a percentage of female 
members in board. I argue that these variables are appropriate proxies for effective corporate 
governance policies because they have well-developed theories behind them and they have been 
significant in many papers, which have studied pay for performance relationship. The first 
research question is about if there are some positive developments of corporate governance 
policies after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. The second research question is about if these 
variables have still as large amount of explanatory power in pay for performance regression 
models after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 as they had prior the crisis.  
Board size (Size): According to many papers, larger boards tend to be less effective and tend 
to offer CEO’s compensation packages that are less sensitive for firm’s performance (e.g. 
Yermack 1996, Core et al. 1999). For example, Core et al. (1999), Ozkan (2007 and 2011), 
Conyon and He (2011) and Schultz et al. (2013) have found that a coefficient for board size is 
significantly positive at one percent level and Hwang and Kim (2009) that it is significantly 
positive at five percent level. Based on these kinds of evidence, I expect positive sign for the 
coefficient of this variable. 
Dummy variable whether CEO is board chair (Duality): Many researches have argued that 
if CEO is also the chair of the board, there might be larger agency problems (e.g. Yermack 
1996, Core et al. 1999). Supportive evidence for this theory have found for example by Core et 
al. (1999), Hartzell and Stark (2003,) Brick et al. (2006), Hwang and Kim (2009), Conyon and 
He (2011) and Schultz et al. (2013), who have found that the “CEO is the chairman”- dummy 
variable is significantly positive at one percent level. Based on these kinds of evidence, I expect 
positive sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
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Percentage of outside directors (%Outsider): According to many papers (e.g. Pfeffer 1981, 
Core et al. 1999), a significant percentage of board members should be outsiders. Otherwise, 
the board may not be independent enough because board members may be loyalty to the 
managers and CEO may get more power. This could cause weaker pay for performance 
relationship and supportive evidence for this theory have found by Core et al. (1999), Ozkan 
(2007), Fahlenbrach (2009), Conyon and He (2011) and Schultz et al. (2013), who have found 
that the coefficient of this variable is significantly negative at one percent level. Based on these 
kinds of evidence, I expect negative sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
Percentage of directors who are over age of 69 (%Aged): According to Core et al. (1999), 
board members may become less effective when they become older and because of this, the 
CEO may get more power. For example, Core et al. (1999) and Hwang and Kim (2009) decided 
to use the age of 69 years as an upper limit for effective board members and I follow their idea. 
Their findings support this theory as they found that the coefficient for this variable is 
significantly positive at five percent level.  
However, this is the first variable that I slightly modified. Core et al. (1999) used a ratio aged 
outsider directors divided by all outsider directors but I argue that a ratio aged directors divided 
by all directors is a more appropriate proxy. This is because members who are both insiders and 
aged could be even less effective in comparison to i) aged outsider and ii) not-aged insiders. 
For example, Hwang and Kim (2009) have offered some supportive evidence for this theory 
because they used the same ratio than I do and found that it is more significant (significantly 
positive at one percent level) than the ratio used by Core et al. (1999). My databases do not 
offer similar kinds of data than Core et al. (1999) had so unfortunately, I cannot do a robustness 
check with their ratio. However, I argue that there are only a few insiders who are aged, so 
these two ratios are quite similar. Based on findings of Core et al. (1999) and Hwang and Kim 
(2009), I expect positive sign for the coefficient of this variable.   
Dummy variable whether board is busy (Busy): According to Core et al. (1999), if board 
members are also members of many other boards, they may be less focused on individual 
companies and therefore be less effective controller of CEO. Following this paper, I use three 
other board membership (i.e. total amount of four) as a lower limit for busy board members. 
However, this is the second variable that I slightly modified, as I decided to use dummy variable 
instead of the percentage of busy members. I do this because Core et al. (1999) found that their 
variable tends to be insignificant and e.g. Ozdemir and Upneja (2012) that it is significant only 
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at ten percent level. Supportive evidence for my variable have found for example by Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006), who have found that the dummy variable tends to be more significant than 
the percentage of busy directors. Based on contradictory evidence, I expect positive sign for the 
coefficient of this variable but I cannot be sure if it is statistically significant. As a robustness 
check, I use the variable used by Core et al. (1999). 
Percentage of outside directors who have a significant relationship with the company 
(%Related):   
According to Core et al. (1999), board members who have a significant relationship with the 
company may be less independent and may give more power to the CEO. These relationships 
could be based on for example the following things: outside manager is appointed by CEO, 
outsider manager or his employer received payments from the company more than his or her 
board pay, inside director of the firm serves on the board of that outside director’s firm. I follow 
this idea but modified the variables slightly because Core et al. (1999) used three variables but 
many of the coefficients of these variables were statistically insignificant in their models. I 
argue that these variables measure too much the same thing, social ties with the CEO, and this 
is the reasons for the insignificant coefficients. For example, Hwang and Kim (2009) have 
found some supportive evidence for my theory because they used one variable (“board 
independence”) and found that it is significant at five percent level. Based on this finding, my 
theory, Core et al. (1999) findings and the fact that my database offers variable called “Outside 
director with past manager position in the company”, I decided to use one variable. Based on 
all that, I expect positive sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
Percentage of females (%Females): As descried in the second chapter, there have been some 
arguments regarding of potential benefits of a gender diversity of boards (e.g. higher attendance 
rate of board meetings or better risk management) but given that these theories are relatively 
recent, there is not a large amount of empirical evidence about this. However, Brick et al. (2006) 
and Alexander and Sherif (2016) have found supportive evidence for these arguments because 
in their papers, the coefficient of gender diversity is significantly positive at one percent level. 
Based on these theories and findings, I expect positive coefficient for this variable. 
To summarize, my second research question is about changes of these variables, which are 
proxies for more effective corporate governance policies. I do not expect any significant 
changes but based on the arguments presented in the previous chapter (public pressure, new 
legislations, and some papers), there could be some. If there have been some changes, corporate 
 31 
governance policies should have become more homogenous and this should cause smaller 
significance for these variables, based on econometrics (see appendix 1). Next table 
summarizes this discussion about effective corporate governance policies and explains why 
more effective corporate governance policies would also mean more homogenous corporate 
governance policies. 
Table 2. Summary of prior findings regarding of corporate governance policies and 
theories behind my homogeneity expectations 
 
This table summarizes prior findings about corporate governance policies from pay for performance relationship 
point of view. The first column has corporate governance variables defined in the table 1. The second column 
defines, what kinds of changes would indicate more effective corporate governance policies, based on the prior 
literature. The third column has key arguments behind statements presented in the second column. The last column 
explains why more effective corporate governance policies would also mean more homogenous corporate 
governance policies. 
3.3.4 Other control variables 
Not only the corporate governance variables but also other control variables have found to be 
significant factors behind differences in pay for performance relationship. Following many 
other papers, I control important CEO’s and firm’s characteristics. Lastly, I include industry-
fixed and year-fixed effects to my models. 
Variable More effective policy means Key argument for effectivity Key argument for larger homogenity expectation 
Size Smaller boards
Larger boards tend to be less 
effective monitors.
There should be a smaller number of companies with 
large boards.
Duality % Smaller %
CEO may have more power if 
he or she is also the chair of 
the board.
There should be a smaller number of companies with 
CEO as the chair of the board.
Outsiders % Larger %
Outside members are less 
likely to have social ties with 
the CEO.
There should be a smaller number of companies with 
significant percentage of inside members on board.
Aged % Smaller %
Aged members tend to be less 
effective monitors.
There should be a smaller number of companies with 
significant percentage of aged members on board.
Busy boards % Smaller %
Busy members tend to be less 
effective monitors.
There should be a smaller number of companies with 
busy boards.
Related % Smaller %
Related members are more 
likely to have social ties with 
the CEO.
There should be a smaller number of companies with 
significant percentage of related members on board.
Females % Larger % 
Gender diversification may 
increase attendance rate and 
quality of risk management.
There should be a smaller number of companies with 
only male members on board.
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CEO’s characteristics 
CEO’s Tenure (Tenure): Following many papers, I control CEO’s tenure for whatever effect 
it might have. For example, CEO’s with longer tenure tend to have more equity incentives, 
which could increase pay for performance relationship due to better aligned interests between 
CEO and shareholders. Some researchers have offered supportive evidence for this theory as 
they have found that the coefficient is significantly negative. For example, Coombs et al. (2005) 
got one percent significance level, Ozkan (2007) five percent level and Conyon et al. (2011) 
ten percent level. Based on these kinds of theories and findings, I expect negative sign for the 
coefficient of this variable. 
CEO’s Stock Ownership (%CEO stocks): The principal agent theory argues that CEO’s 
higher stock ownership indicates better aligned interests between shareholders and CEO.  
This may have many kinds of consequences for pay for performance relationship and prior 
studies have offered supportive evidence for this theory. For example, Hwang and Kim (2009) 
have found that this coefficient is significantly negative at one percent level, Coombs et al. 
(2005) and Bricks et al. (2006) that it is significantly negative at five percent level and Barnhart 
and Rosenstein (1998) that it is significantly negative at ten percent level. Based on these kinds 
of findings and the principal agent-theory, I expect negative sign for the coefficient of this 
variable. 
Firm’s characteristics 
Firm Size (Sales): According to the principal agent theory, when a firm becomes bigger, it 
tends to become more complex because of that, different kinds of agency problems may 
increase. Moreover, the managers of bigger companies tend to be wealthier so they need larger 
compensation to become motivated. Based on these kinds of theories, the prior literature argues 
that the optimal level of compensation increases with firm size (e.g. Core and Guay 1999). 
There are many options for the proxy of size but because e.g. Core et al. (1999), Coombs et al. 
(2005), Bricks et al. (2006) and Ozkan (2007) have found that a sales is significantly positive 
at one percent level and Conyon et al. (2011) that it is significantly positive at five percent level, 
I decided to use the sales as my main proxy for the size of company. In addition, I make a 
robustness check by using other measurement of the size, the total assets. Based on these 
theories and prior findings, I expect positive sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
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Leverage and risk (D/A): Not only return but also risk is a significant factor that determines 
CEO’s performance. There are many alternative proxies for controlling risks but interestingly, 
many of them tend to be insignificant. For example, Conyon and He (2009) have offered 
evidence that a volatility of stock return is insignificant and Brick et al. (2006) have found that 
a cash flow risk is insignificant. However, Frye (2004), Duffhues and Kabir (2008) and Schultz 
et al. (2013) have found that debt to asset ratio is significant at one percent level in some of 
their similar kinds of regressions (not in all). In addition, Conyon et al. (2011) have offered 
evidence that the coefficient for D/A is significant at five percent level in some of their similar 
kinds of regressions (not in all), so I decided to use D/A ratio as a proxy for leverage and risk. 
However, based on the prior evidence, I do not know if the coefficient will be significant. 
Growth opportunities (M/B): According to the principal agent theory, it is more difficult for 
shareholders of a growth company to determine an appropriate strategy for their company, so 
they tend to give more equity incentives for managers to align interests (e.g. Gaver and Gaver 
1993). There are some alternative proxies for growth opportunities but because Leone et al. 
(2006), Hwang and Kim (2009), Fahlenbrach (2009) and Conyon and He (2011) have found 
that the book to market ratio is significantly negative at one percent level and Conyon and He 
(2011) that it is significantly negative at five percent level, I decided to use market to book ratio 
a proxy for he growth opportunities. Based on these kinds of finding and the principal agent 
theory, I expect negative sign for the coefficient of this variable.  
Industry: Following many papers (e.g. Cooper et al. 2009 and Brick et al 2006) I calculate 
industry-controlled (or in other words, industry-adjusted returns). There are many reasons, 
which make industry important. For example, Cooper et al. (2009) found that different 
industries tend to have different structure of executive compensation and this can have 
significant effects to the pay for performance relationship. Following the prior literature, I use 
industry groups offered by the database (in my case the BoardEx). I have 24 industry groups 
and a comprehensive description about the industry groups can be found from the appendix 2. 
Year: Lastly, following many papers (e.g. Core et al. 1999, Brick et al. 2006, Cooper et al. 
2009,) I calculate year-controlled returns. I use years 2006 and 2010 as base years in pre- and 
post-crisis regressions and add dummy variables for the other years (2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 
2012, 1013).  
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3.3.5 Variables for robustness checks 
Because of a large amount of prior research, some researches have used many alternative 
variables. Given that significance of these variables has varied substantially depending on the 
data and variables, I decided to make robustness checks by using the following variables, even 
though my main variables tend to be more significant. 
Stock return: Following a large part of the literature, I use this variable as a market based 
return to make a robustness check. For example, Hartzell and Starks (2003), Brick et al. (2006), 
Ozkan (2007), Fahlenbrach (2009), Hwang and Kim (2009) and Conyon and He (2009) have 
found that the stock return is significant at one percent level and Conyon et al. (2011) that it is 
significant at five percent level. Based on these kinds of findings and new legislations, I expect 
positive and statistically and economically significant coefficient for this variable, even though 
Duffhues and Kabir (2008) have found very interesting results, which state that the coefficient 
is significantly negative at one percent level in similar kind of regression. To test if the pay for 
performance relationship varies depending on the period, I use periods of one, three and five 
years. 
Percentage of busy board directors (%Busy): As descripted earlier, some researchers have 
used a dummy variable for the busy board (at least 50% of the board members are members of 
four or more boards) and found that it is more often significant in comparison to percentage of 
busy members. However, because for example, Core et al. (1999) have used the percentage of 
busy members and theoretically, it could be a more accurate proxy, I make robustness check by 
using this variable. 
Size: To test if a proxy for size of company makes some difference, I test alternative proxy, the 
total assets. I use the total asset because e.g. Schultz et al. (2013) and Alexander and Sherif 
(2016) have found that it is significant at one percent level.  
CEO age: Similarly, to test if a proxy for power of CEO makes some difference, I test 
alternative proxy, the CEO age, which has been significant at ten percent level (e.g. Ozkan 
2007). 
Based on my best knowledge, there seems to be no important alternative variables for the other 
control variables. Moreover, based on following reasons, I argue that my models are an 
appropriate way to study my research questions. First, I use the variables that have been the 
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most significant ones (e.g. the board size, CEO=chairman dummy variable) in pay for 
performance regressions. Second, I only slightly modified variables that have been slightly less 
significant (e.g. slightly different way to control outsider directors who are former employees 
of the company), so many other papers have used almost the same variables than I do. Some 
small differences exist basically because other papers have slightly different research questions. 
Third, I have already quite many variables that measures independence and power of boards 
and one should not add too many variables, which measure the same thing (e.g. Stock and 
Watson 2007). Fourth, I make robustness checks to mitigate challenges related to the variables 
(e.g. some researchers have had non-public information that I cannot get). A more 
comprehensive discussion about the limitations of this paper can be found from the chapter 5. 
Below is the descriptive table that summarizes my variables. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the variables, the whole data sample (2006-2013) 
This table presents means, medians and standard deviations of my variables, with the whole data set from the years 
2006-2013 (3199 observations). 
Compensation variables Mean Median Standard deviation
Total Compensation ($ million) 5.7 3.7 8.9
Cash compensation ($ million) 1.0 0.8 1.5
Salary ($ million) 0.8 0.7 0.4
Performance variable
ROA 4.2% 4.0% 9.5%
Corporate governance variables
Size 9.1 9.0 2.5
Duality 0.6 1.0 0.5
%Outsiders 78.2% 81.8% 14.5%
%Aged 19.7% 15.8% 18.9%
Busy 0.03 0.0 0.2
%Related 15.1% 14.3% 14.0%
%Females 12.0% 11.1% 12.7%
CEO charasteristics
Tenure (years) 8.1 6.3 7.2
%CEO stocks 2.7% 0.9% 5.4%
Company controls
Sales ($ million) 6.5 1.1 22.1
D/A 55.7% 56.0% 23.0%
M/B 1.2 0.9 1.1
Robustness check
Stock Return (1 year) 22.5% 15.9% 62.3%
Stock Return (3 years) 9.4% 9.0% 22.7%
Stock Return (5 years) 8.1% 7.0% 19.2%
Total Assets ($ millions) 18.7 2.2 112.6
%BUSY 9.0% 0.0% 16.9%
CEO age (years) 54.7 54.0 6.8
n=3199
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Given that the purpose of this paper is to study effects of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and 
its consequences for a pay for performance relationship point of view, I do not offer a 
comprehensive comparison of data between my paper and prior studies. Generally, my data 
looks quite similar than data used in prior studies. For example, the average size of board is 
approximately nine members, as it was in Fahlenbrach’s (2009) paper. Some differences exist 
as I include smaller companies than many of the other papers, which have focused on large 
companies (e.g. S&P500). However, given the scope of this paper, it is more interesting to 
compare pre-and post-crisis data. Below is the descriptive statistics for the pre- (2006-2009) 
and post-crisis data sets (2010-2013), respectively. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the variables, the pre-crisis data sample (2006-2009) 
This table present means, medians and standard deviations of my variables with the pre-crisis data set from the 
years 2006-2009 (952 observations). 
 
Compensation variables Mean Median Standard deviation
Total Compensation ($ million) 4.2 2.5 5.1
Cash compensation ($ million) 0.9 0.7 1.1
Salary ($ million) 0.7 0.6 0.4
Performance variable
ROA 3.1% 3.3% 10.7%
Corporate governance variables
Size 8.7 8.0 2.4
Duality 0.7 1.0 0.5
%Outsiders 76.6% 80.0% 14.0%
%Aged 17.1% 14.3% 18.1%
Busy 0.03 0.0 0.2
%Related 13.9% 14.3% 13.9%
%Females 10.0% 9.1% 13.2%
CEO charasteristics
Tenure (years) 9.2 7.0 7.4
%CEO stocks 4.4% 1.8% 7.0%
Company controls
Sales ($ million) 3.9 0.8 14.7
D/A 54.9% 54.4% 24.3%
M/B 1.2 0.9 1.2
Robustness check
Stock Return (1 year) 17.5% 5.9% 85.2%
Stock Return (3 years) 0.5% -0.2% 22.3%
Stock Return (5 years) 8.2% 7.1% 20.5%
Total Assets ($ million) 12.4 1.3 85.7
%BUSY 9.2% 0.0% 16.5%
CEO age (years) 54.0 54.0 6.9
n=952
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of the variables, the post-crisis data sample (2010-2013) 
 
This table present means, medians and standard deviations of my variables with the post-crisis data set from the 
years 2010-2013 (2247 observations). 
Based on these tables, one can see that there have been some changes in corporate governance 
policies. The average size of board has increased as well as the percentages of outsiders, aged 
members, related members and females. In addition, there are more non-CEO chairs of the 
board. However, one cannot see from these tables if these changes are statistically significant 
and analysis that is more comprehensive is offered in the fourth chapter. Before that, I present 
correlation table to make sure that my variables are not too correlated with each other’s. 
 
 
Compensation variables Mean Median Standard deviation
Total Compensation ($ million) 6.4 4.3 10.0
Cash compensation ($ million) 1.2 0.8 1.6
Salary ($ million) 0.8 0.8 0.4
Performance variable
ROA 4.7% 4.2% 8.9%
Corporate governance variables
Size 9.3 9.0 2.6
Duality 0.6 1.0 0.5
%Outsiders 78.9% 83.3% 14.6%
%Aged 20.8% 16.7% 19.1%
Busy 0.03 0.0 0.2
%Related 15.6% 14.3% 14.0%
%Females 12.9% 12.5% 12.3%
CEO charasteristics
Tenure (years) 7.6 5.8 7.0
%CEO stocks 2.0% 0.6% 4.4%
Company controls
Sales ($ million) 7.6 1.4 24.4
D/A 56.1% 56.7% 22.4%
M/B 1.2 0.9 1.1
Robustness check
Stock Return (1 year) 24.6% 19.2% 49.4%
Stock Return (3 years) 13.2% 12.4% 21.8%
Stock Return (5 years) 8.1% 7.0% 18.6%
Total Assets ($ million) 21.3 2.7 122.1
%BUSY 8.9% 0.0% 17.0%
CEO age (years) 55.0 55.0 6.7
n=2247
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As in the prior literature, I did not find large correlations. Only significant correlations are 
between the dummy variable for busy board and percentage of busy members (obviously) and 
between sales and market value. These variables are not in same models so there will not be 
any problems related to correlations between dependent variables. 
 
3.4 Regression models 
 
Based on the prior literature, the research questions and my variables, I use three different 
regression models with both pre- and post-crisis data to answer to the second and third research 
questions: 
 
Total Compensation=B0+β1ROA+β2Size+β3Duality+β4%Outsider+β5%Aged+β6Busy+ 
β7%Related+ β8%Females+ β9Tenure+ β10%CEO Stocks+ β11Sales+β12D/A+ 
β13M/B+βindustry+βYear 
 
Cash Compensation=B0+β1ROA+β2Size+β3Duality+β4%Outsider+β5%Aged+β6Busy+ 
β7%Related+β8%Females+β9Tenure+β10%CEOStocks+β11Sales+β12D/A+β13M/B+β 
industry+βYear 
 
Salary=B0+β1ROA+β2Size+β3Duality+β4%Outsider+β5%Aged+β6Busy+β7%Related+ 
β8%Females+β9Tenure+β10%CEOStocks+β11Sales+β12D/A(t-
1)+β13M/B+βindustry+βYear 
Furthermore, I do robustness check by using stock return with different periods, one, three and 
five years. Dependent variables and control variables are the same as in the previous models 
with ROA, so these models look like the following:   
Total Compensation=B0+β1Stock Return+β2Size+β3Duality+β4%Outsider+β5%Aged+ 
β6Busy+β7%Related+β8%Females+β9Tenure+β10%CEO Stocks+β11Sales+β12D/A+β13M/B 
+βindustry+βYear 
 
Cash Compensation=B0+β1Stock Return+β2Size+β3Duality+ β4%Outsider+β5%Aged+ 
β6Busy+β7%Related+β8%Females+β9Tenure+β10%CEO Stocks+β11Sales+β12D/A+β13M/B 
+βindustry+βYear 
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Salary(t)= B0+β1Stock Return(t-1)+β2Size(t-1)+ β3Duality(t-1)+ β4%Outsider (t-1)+ β5%Aged (t-1)+ 
β6Busy(t-1)+ β7%Related(t-1)+ β8%Females(t-1)+ β9Tenure(t-1)+ β10%CEO Stocks(t-1)+ β11Sales(t-
1)+β12D/A(t-1)+ β13M/B(t-1) +β industry+ β Year 
In addition, I use alternative variables and models described in the third chapter and these 
results are presented in the chapter 4.5. 
4. Results  
 
In this chapter, I present my results. In the chapter 4.1, I present my answer to the first research 
question by calculating t-values for differences of corporate governance variables between pre- 
and post-crisis data. Then, I present my answers to the second and third research questions by 
my doing regression analyses with the pre-crisis data (chapter 4.2) and with the post-crisis data 
(4.3).  
4.1 T-values for differences of the corporate governance policies 
 
To answer to the first research question, I calculated t-values for the differences (an unpaired 
sample t-tests that two means are equal) based on the values presented in the descriptive tables 
(the third chapter) and got the following results.  
Table 7: T-values for the differences of corporate governance policies 
 
 
This table presents t-values for the differences of corporate governance variables between pre- and post-crisis data. 
The critical values for the 10 %, 5% and 1% significance levels are approximately 1.65, 1.96 and 2.56, respectively. 
Therefore, all variables except the “Busy” and the “%Busy” are statistically significantly different pre- and –post-
crisis. 
 
Corporate governance variable Pre-crisis Post-crisis T-value for the difference
Size 8.74 9.28 5.65
Duality 0.66 0.56 5.10
%Outsiders 76.58% 78.85% 4.13
%Aged 17.13% 20.83% 5.21
Busy 0.03 0.03 0.67
%Related 13.88% 15.55% 3.09
%Females 10.04% 12.86% 5.60
%Busy 9.18% 8.90% 0.01
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Based on these results, it seems that corporate governance policies have at least partially 
changed because all variables except proxies for an urgency of boards (Busy and %Busy) have 
t-values, which are significant at one percent level. However, there are two issues to consider 
before further interpretations. First, even though initially these results seem to offer supportive 
evidence for Murphy (2012) and Kaplan (2013) as corporate governance policies have become 
different, they actually offer mostly evidence about less effective corporate governance 
policies. Second, the economic significance of the changes is questionable.  
One example from potentially less effective corporate governance policies is an increased 
average size of board. On the one hand, one could argue that the prior literature has offered 
evidence about negative effects of the larger board size due to more significant free rider 
problem. On the other hand, one could argue that companies have become more complex, which 
could cause a need of larger boards (e.g. Coles et al. 2008). Based on these theories, one could 
not know which one is a more appropriate interpretation and regression analysis presented in 
the following chapters may offer some further evidence about the current state of corporate 
governance policies. 
However, some changes seem to offer more powerful evidence about less effective corporate 
governance policies after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. To my best knowledge, there is no 
theory about positive effects of larger percentage of related members. Given the decreased 
percentage of insider members, one could claim that the public pressure and new regulations 
(e.g. new listing requirements) have pressured companies to take larger number of outsiders but 
they have done that by taking more related members (i.e. former managers of the company). 
This is at least one potential explanation for the quite small change in percentage of members 
who are neither insiders nor related (from 62.5% to 63.3%). Moreover, percentage of aged 
members has increased even though they tend to be less effective monitors, so companies might 
have taken their former, retired managers to increase the number of outside directors. 
Unfortunately, my database does not offer detailed enough data to check if aged members tend 
to be related members, so I cannot test this theory. 
The second major issue to consider is the economic significance of the changes. On the one 
hand, one could ask does it matter if the average size of board has increased by 0.6 members 
and argue that this has happened most likely because companies have become more complex. 
On the other hand, one could ask if there is some evidence about increasing complexity and 
argue that positive trends of corporate governance policies are important issues because it is 
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unrealistic to assume that corporate governance policies could change quickly. Based on these, 
it could be that the change in long-term trend of decreasing board (e.g. 13 in the paper of Core 
et al. in 1999, 10 in the paper of Conyon and He in 2011) is a significant issue. Which one is a 
more appropriate interpretation is a difficult question and out of the scope of this study. 
As the previous examples show, the current state of corporate governance policies is not a 
straightforward issue to analyze because there have been both negative and positive 
developments. On the one hand, there have been positive (based on the prior literature) and 
statistically significant changes, a smaller portion of CEO-chair dualities as well as increased 
percentages of female and outside members of board are positive developments. On the other 
hand, most developments are against prior findings about effective corporate governance 
policies (i.e. some part of corporate governance policies seem to have become less effective) 
and the economic significance of all the changes is questionable. Based on all these, there is no 
straightforward answer to the first research question and I cannot reject the first hypothesis. 
However, the following regression analysis may offer more evidence about the current state of 
corporate governance policies. 
 
4.2. Pre-crisis regressions 
 
When I used ROA as a performance measurement and did regression analyses with pre-crisis 
data set, I got the following results. 
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Table 8: Pay for performance regressions with ROA and pre-crisis data 
 
This table shows pre-crisis (2006-2009) pay for performance regressions with ROA as a performance 
measurement. Dependent variables are the following three variables: Total compensation is an annual total 
compensation paid to CEO. Cash compensation is a sum of annual salary and bonus. Salary is an annual fixed 
compensation. Independent variables are the following: ROA is a return on assets. Size is number of directors on 
board. Duality is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if CEO is also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. 
%Outsiders is a percentage of board of directors who are not employees of the company. %Aged is a percentage 
of board of directors who are older than 69 years old. Busy is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if at least 50% 
of board of directors serve on three or more other boards and 0 otherwise. %Related is a percentage of board of 
directors who have been employees of the company but currently are not. %Females is a percentage of board of 
directors who are female. Tenure is number of years the CEO has been CEO. %CEO Stocks is a stockholding of 
the CEO (%). Sales is an annual revenue. D/A is a total debt divided by total assets. M/B is a market value of the 
company divided by total assets. The regressions contain a set of 24 industry groups and 3 time dummies, from 
Variable Predicted sign Total Compensation Cash compensation Salary 
Performance variable
ROA + 49.55*** 8.11*** 3.32***
15.49 3.09 0.93
Corporate governance variables
Size + 456.36*** 87.21** 24.11***
103.14 43.29 5.62
Duality + 1204.15*** 191.38*** 125.84***
279.07 57.91 18.56
%Outsiders - 1065.45 -728.23** -12.21
1131.6 311.93 87.49
%Aged + 56.79 64.09 94.86
998.86 244.21 64.11
Busy ? 1466.32 -55.37 -27.51
1474.52 254.21 117.39
%Related + 481.90 -56.37 6.31
1115.45 191.15 67.00
%Females - 359.40 184.49 99.47
1227.07 334.27 89.64
CEO charasteristic variables
Tenure (years) ? 0.13** 0.05*** 0.02***
0.06 0.01 0.005
%CEO stocks - -121.68*** -19.93*** -13.89***
19.41 3.30 1.80
Company charasteristic variables
Sales ($ thousands ) + 74.10*** 7.14** 6.29***
1.83 3.14 1.73
D/A ? 2934.75*** 44.14 209.19***
790.84 210.23 50.90
M/B + -135.15 -92.74*** -30.90***
132.65 28.00 9.56
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 952 952 952
Adjusted r-squared 0.29 0.14 0.38
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2007 to 2009, with 2006 as a base year. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are heteroskedastic -robust standard errors.  
 
Given that the scope of this paper is to study effects of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and its 
consequences, I do not make a comprehensive comparison to findings of prior literature. 
However, it is important to notice that contrary to the prior findings, four corporate governance 
variables (outsiders, aged, busy, related) are insignificant. Based on that, one could argue that 
for some reason, corporate governance policies have become less significant from the pay for 
performance point of view. Moreover, given the changes of corporate governance policies and 
the strong link between corporate governance policies and pay for performance relationship, it 
is particularly interesting to test if corporate governance policies have become even less 
significant after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
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4.3 Post-crisis regressions 
 
When I used ROA and post-crisis data set, I got the following results. 
 
Table 9:  Pay for performance regressions with ROA and post-crisis data  
 
This table shows post-crisis (2010-2013) pay for performance regressions with ROA as a performance 
measurement. Dependent variables are the following three variables: Total compensation is an annual total 
compensation paid to CEO. Cash compensation is a sum of annual salary and bonus. Salary is an annual fixed 
compensation. Independent variables are the following: ROA is a return on assets. Size is number of directors on 
board. Duality is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if CEO is also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. 
%Outsiders is a percentage of board of directors who are not employees of the company. %Aged is a percentage 
of board of directors who are older than 69 years old. Busy is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if at least 50% 
of board of directors serve on three or more other boards and 0 otherwise. %Related is a percentage of board of 
directors who have been employees of the company but currently are not. %Females is a percentage of board of 
directors who are female. Tenure is number of years the CEO has been CEO. %CEO Stocks is a stockholding of 
Variable Predicted sign Total Compensation Cash compensation Salary 
Performance variable
ROA + 78.55*** 2.87 4.55***
29.50 2.23 0.88
Corporate governance variables
Size + 526.35*** 102.25*** 34.24***
122.16 29.17 5.20
Duality + 815.41* 201.28*** 82.15***
485.53 50.82 15.66
%Outsiders - -461.69 -899.46*** 12.53
1499.45 268.35 86.15
%Aged + 1304.60* 508.34* 170.82***
786.81 288.76 43.61
Busy ? 1572.28 -118.48 141.89
1871.17 218.93 102.76
%Related + 1654.17** 326.55** 256.72***
751.82 141.38 63.57
%Females - -1854.56 -61.14 -38.79
1179.60 252.93 85.49
CEO charasteristic variables
Tenure (years) ? 0.09 0.05*** 0.03***
0.07 0.01 0.004
%CEO stocks - -237.41*** -29.60*** -21.19***
28.41 5.04 2.27
Company charasteristic variables
Sales ($ thousands ) + 107.87*** 11.09*** 4.77***
34.15 1.43 0.53
D/A ? 5242.07*** 266.55** 274.76***
669.48 130.49 41.00
M/B + 537.13* -44.28** -22.66
300.96 20.82 8.26
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2247 2247 2247
Adjusted r-squared 0.16 0.18 0.35
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the CEO (%). Sales is an annual revenue. D/A is a total debt divided by total assets. M/B is a market value of the 
company divided by total assets. The regressions contain a set of 24 industry groups and 3 time dummies, from 
2011 to 2013, with 2010 as a base year. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are heteroskedastic -robust standard errors. 
 
Regarding of the second research question, the first interesting finding from the tables 8 and 9 
is a decreased significance of the variable “Duality”, which offers some evidence against my 
first and second hypotheses. It seems that the recent changes, the financial crisis of 2007-2008, 
followed new legislation and public pressure, have encouraged companies to take more non-
CEO chairmen, which is a more effective corporate governance policy based on the prior 
literature. Moreover, the significance of this variable has decreased from one percent level to 
ten percent level, offering supportive evidence for the strong link between corporate governance 
policies and pay for performance relationship. However, given that this is the only variable, 
which offers evidence against my first and second hypotheses, I cannot reject them. Generally, 
my results offer supportive evidence for my first and second hypothesis and for the strong link 
between corporate governance policies and pay for performance relationship based on the 
following arguments. 
 
Even though the variable “Duality” offers evidence against my first hypothesis, other variables 
do not. Excluding the “Duality”, there are two groups of variables. The first group of variables 
is the ones with increased significance, “Size”, “%Aged” and “%Related”. Interestingly, these 
parts of corporate governance policy seem to have become less effective and more significant 
in the pay for performance regression, offering supportive evidence for my first and second 
hypotheses and for the strong link between corporate governance policies and pay for 
performance relationship. The second group of variables is the ones with the unchanged 
significance, “%Outsiders”, “%Females” and “Busy”. One can see from the tables 7, 8 and 9 
that the percentage of busy boards as well as significance of its coefficient have stayed at the 
same level, so no further interpretations can be made from the strong link point of view. More 
interestingly, significance of variables “%Outsiders” and “%Females” have stayed insignificant 
even though these parts of corporate governance policies seem to have become more effective. 
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Therefore, one could ask if these variables offer evidence against the strong link between 
corporate governance policies and pay for performance relationship.  
 
Basically, there are two alternative explanation for this as either i) these changes of efficiency 
(i.e. larger percentages of females and outsiders in board of directors) are not significant from 
the pay for performance point of view or ii) the link between corporate governance policies and 
pay for performance relationship is not as strong as the prior literature has argued. I argue that 
based on the following arguments, the first one is more likely explanation. First, to my best 
knowledge, there is no empirical evidence about if the larger percentage of females has a 
significant effect from the pay for performance point of view. It could be that the larger gender 
diversity has some positive consequences, such as better risk management, but no significant 
effects to the pay for performance relationship. Small statistical significance of coefficients of 
this variable offers some supportive evidence for this theory but it would be interesting to see 
some further studies about effects of female board members. Second, I argue that related 
members are as likely to have social ties with CEO as insiders are, so they are as ineffective 
monitors as outsiders are. Based on that, the unchanged significance of the coefficient of 
outsiders is an expected result, given that the amount of purely outsider (that is, not insider or 
related) members have increased only slightly from 62.7 % to 63.3 %. Therefore, the unchanged 
significance of the coefficient of outsiders is not evidence against the strong link. 
 
I argue that above-mentioned theories are quite plausible and all variables offer some supportive 
evidence for the strong link between corporate governance policies and pay for performance 
relationship. This is because one part of corporate governance policies (Duality) has become 
more effective and the significance of this coefficient has decreased in pay for performance 
regressions, as it theoretically should. Moreover, three parts of the corporate governance 
policies (Size, %Aged, %Related) have become less effective and the significance of the 
coefficients of these variables have decreased in pay for performance regressions. In addition, 
there is a plausible theory for the insignificant effect of female board members so the unchanged 
significance of variable “%Female” is not evidence against the strong link. However, 
robustness checks with regression models without this variable are presented in the next 
chapter. Lastly, an urgency of board members and amount of purely independent members have 
stayed at the same level, so unchanged coefficients are the expected result. To summarize this 
 48 
discussion about the second research question, the next table presents key findings related to 
the second research question. 
 
Table 10: Summary of findings related to the second research question 
 
This table summarizes key findings related to the second research question. The first column has the variables 
defined in the table 1. The second column has a type of change after the financial crisis of 2007-2008, i.e. if the 
 49 
given part of corporate governance policy has become more (positive) or less (negative) effective. The third 
column offers information if a homogeneity of given part of corporate governance policy has changed 
after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. The fourth column has the argument behind the interpretation presented in 
the third column. Fifth column presents the change of significance of the given variable in pay for performance 
regression. The last column has my interpretation about the whole change after the crisis, i.e. what the change of 
the given part of the corporate governance policy (i.e. given variable), change of homogeneity and change of 
significance all together indicate. 
 
Regarding of the third hypothesis, the first finding is increased significance of the coefficient 
of ROA, which offers some evidence against the third hypothesis. However, as e.g. Mehran 
(1995) and Core et al. (1999) have argued, it is important to separate compensation into 
different forms to get additional information and interestingly, the evidence is inconsistent 
between different forms of compensation. More closely, even though the coefficient of ROA 
has become larger in regression with total compensation, it has stayed at the same level in 
regression with salary. More interestingly, the coefficient of ROA has become statistically 
insignificant in regression with cash compensation. 
 
There are few alternative explanations for this insignificant coefficient. First, one could argue 
that probably the portion of fixed salary has increased and the fixed compensation is not 
correlated with short-term performance. However, both seem to be inappropriate expectations 
as increase of salary (from 0.7 to 0.8) has been slower than increase of bonus (from 0.2 to 0.4) 
and interestingly, the fixed compensation seems to be correlated with ROA. Second and more 
likely explanation is that after the financial crisis of 2007-2008, companies might not want to 
encourage short-term risk taking, which is one focus area of the new legislation. Based on all 
that, one can see that the new legislation may decrease the pay for performance relationship 
because it highlights the importance of risk management.  
 
Further analysis offers more evidence about a trade-off between the stronger pay for 
performance relationship and better risk management, which has been important part of the new 
legislation. As one can see, the pay for performance relationship is stronger with the total 
compensation. Moreover, the total compensation is a combination of cash compensation (i.e. 
salary and bonus) and equity-based compensation. Given that the cash compensation is not 
correlated with the past ROA but the total compensation does, one can see that the pay for 
performance is stronger with equity-based compensation. Therefore, on the one hand, 
companies might be able to increase the level of pay for performance relationship by increasing 
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the portion of equity-based compensation. On the other hand, they might not want to do that, 
as one purpose of the new legislation has been to decrease the amount of equity-based 
compensation to mitigate risk taking (e.g. Adams 2012). Based on that, it is interesting that the 
portion of equity-based compensation has increased and the pay for performance relationship 
has become stronger in regression with the total compensation due to stronger pay for 
performance relationship between ROA and equity-based compensation. 
 
To summarize my results regarding of the third research question, the pay for performance 
relationship seems to have become stronger after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the 
reason for this is most likely the increased correlation between past ROA and equity-based 
compensation. This presents an interesting trade-off between stronger pay for performance 
relationship and better risk management, which is one focus area of the new legislation. More 
closely, if one gives CEO large amount of equity-incentives, one probably gets stronger pay for 
performance relationship but at the same time, one also encourages CEO to take more risks. 
Finding the optimal balance between these two issues is one key thing of compensation policy. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
 
Because my answer to the first research question is based on simply statistics, there is no need 
to make any robustness checks related to this question. However, given that many kinds of 
variables and models have used in pay for performance regressions, I do robustness checks 
related to the second and third research questions. First, I use alternative performance 
measurement, stock returns with different periods (one, three and five years). Then, I test if I 
get similar kinds of results with alternative variables and models. 
 
5.1 The stock return as a performance measurement 
 
When I used stock return as a performance measurement, I got the following results with the 
pre- and post- crisis data, respectively. 
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Table 11: Pay for performance regressions with the one year’s stock return and pre-crisis 
data 
 
This table shows pre-crisis (2006-2009) pay for performance regressions with one year stock return as a 
performance measurement. Dependent variables are the following three variables: Total compensation is an annual 
total compensation paid to CEO. Cash compensation is a sum of annual salary and bonus. Salary is an annual 
fixed compensation. Independent variables are the following: ROA is a return on assets. Size is number of directors 
on board. Duality is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if CEO is also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. 
%Outsiders is a percentage of board of directors who are not employees of the company. %Aged is a percentage 
of board of directors who are older than 69 years old. Busy is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if at least 50% 
of board of directors serve on three or more other boards and 0 otherwise. %Related is a percentage of board of 
directors who have been employees of the company but currently are not. %Females is a percentage of board of 
directors who are female. Tenure is number of years the CEO has been CEO. %CEO Stocks is a stockholding of 
the CEO (%). Sales is an annual revenue. D/A is a total debt divided by total assets. M/B is a market value of the 
company divided by total assets. The regressions contain a set of 24 industry groups and 3 time dummies, from 
Variable Predicted sign Total Compensation Cash compensation Salary 
Performance variable
Stock return + -0.10 0.43 0.05
1.40 0.35 0.09
Corporate governance variables
Size + 472.08*** 90.09** 25.20***
103.50 43.25 5.73
Duality + 1237.53*** 196.14*** 128.00***
281.57 58.62 18.67
%Outsiders - 948.43 -723.84** -17.09
1131.73 305.39 88.21
%Aged + 33.12 58.20 92.97
1006.73 245.50 64.46
Busy ? 1563.39 -35.76 -20.49
1149.53 259.81 118.91
%Related + 527.69 -37.17 10.84
1124.76 198.92 67.47
%Females - 392.95 186.79 101.31
1242.70 337.28 90.40
CEO charasteristic variables
Tenure (years) ? 0.13** 0.05*** 0.02***
0.06 0.02 0.004
%CEO stocks - -121.29*** -20.00*** -13.88
19.49 3.31 1.80
Company charasteristic variables
Sales ($ thousands ) + 75.22*** 7.42** 6.38***
18.61 3.15 1.74
D/A ? 2702.34*** -17.87 190.61***
803.56 213.08 51.97
M/B + 67.37 -64.53** -17.95
130.33 30.48 9.33
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 952 952 952
Adjusted r-squared 0.28 0.13 0.38
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2007 to 2009, with 2006 as a base year. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are heteroskedastic -robust standard errors. 
 
Table 12: Pay for performance regressions with the one year’s stock return and post-crisis 
data 
 
This table shows post-crisis (2010-2013) pay for performance regressions with one year stock return as a 
performance measurement. Dependent variables are the following three variables: Total compensation is an annual 
total compensation paid to CEO. Cash compensation is a sum of annual salary and bonus. Salary is an annual 
fixed compensation. Independent variables are the following: ROA is a return on assets. Size is number of directors 
on board. Duality is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if CEO is also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. 
%Outsiders is a percentage of board of directors who are not employees of the company. %Aged is a percentage 
of board of directors who are older than 69 years old. Busy is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if at least 50% 
of board of directors serve on three or more other boards and 0 otherwise. %Related is a percentage of board of 
directors who have been employees of the company but currently are not. %Females is a percentage of board of 
directors who are female. Tenure is number of years the CEO has been CEO. %CEO Stocks is a stockholding of 
the CEO (%). Sales is an annual revenue. D/A is a total debt divided by total assets. M/B is a market value of the 
Variable Predicted sign Total Compensation Cash compensation Salary 
Performance variable
Stock return + 2.58 0.88* 0.07
2.45 0.44 0.12
Corporate governance variables
Size + 553.80*** 103.83*** 35.78***
116.30 28.91 5.29
Duality + 860.24* 204.72*** 84.56***
471.80 50.76 15.74
%Outsiders - -531.48 -907.15*** 9.02
1523.29 268.65 86.98
%Aged + 1318.75* 510.19* 171.50***
791.18 288.67 43.68
Busy ? 1590.3 -114.23 142.56
1870.90 219.20 103.56
%Related + 1693.57** 327.83** 259.02***
754.97 140.91 63.76
%Females - -1717.05 -46.72 -31.80
1188.87 252.95 86.15
CEO charasteristic variables
Tenure (years) ? 0.09 0.05*** 0.03***
0.07 0.01 0.003
%CEO stocks - -246.45*** -29.83*** -21.72***
28.71 5.00 2.31
Company charasteristic variables
Sales ($ thousands ) + 109.74*** 11.17*** 4.88***
34.85 1.43 0.53
D/A ? 4627.52*** 225.81* 241.06***
635.76 126.51 42.05
M/B + 751.70** -43.26* -9.51
360.79 22.11 7.48
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2247 2247 2247
Adjusted r-squared 0.16 0.18 0.34
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company divided by total assets. The regressions contain a set of 24 industry groups and 3 time dummies, from 
2011 to 2013, with 2010 as a base year. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are heteroskedastic -robust standard errors. 
 
Regarding of the second research question, these results are consistent with initial results 
presented in the table 10. Again, “Duality” and percentages of related and aged members have 
become less significant, “Size” has become more significant and other corporate governance 
variables have stayed insignificant. Therefore, this offers more supportive evidence for the first 
and second hypotheses and for the strong link between corporate governance polies and pay for 
performance relationship. 
 
However, regarding of the third research question, these results are completely different with 
ROA and with one year’s stock return as the coefficient of one year’s stock return tend to be 
insignificant. Therefore, this offers supportive evidence for my third hypotheses as the change 
in level of pay for performance relationship seems to depend on the performance measurement. 
Similar kinds of results have found by Firth et al. (2007) in China and there are few likely 
explanations for this phenomenon. First, it could be that companies use more accounting based 
performance measurement (e.g. ROA) than market based performance measurements (e.g. 
stock return) in their compensation policies. Furthermore, given that the difference of 
significance between one year’s stock return and ROA is highest in regression with total 
compensation, one could argue that one year is too short time period to measure market-based 
return. This is because large part of the total compensation seems to be equity based, which 
tends to be based on long-term performance (quite often e.g. 3 years’ stock return). Moreover, 
the new legislation encourages long-term policies rather than short-term, so it is interesting to 
study if the pay for performance relationship is stronger with longer-term stock return. 
Therefore, the next robustness check is about the relationship between different forms of 
compensation and three years’ stock return. 
 
5.2 Other robustness checks 
 
Given the different results with ROA and with one year’s stock return, it is interesting to study 
the pay for performance relationship with three years’ and five years’ stock returns, especially 
because the new legislation has highlighted the importance of long-term policies. Secondly, 
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given that many kinds of models and variables have used to study pay for performance 
relationship, I test alternative control variables. 
 
5.2.1 Stock returns of longer periods  
 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the followed new legislation may have pressured 
companies to focus on long-term performance and due to that, companies may have taken more 
long-term focused compensation policies. Based on this theory and inconsistent results 
regarding of the third research question, I decided to test if the relationship between different 
forms of compensation and stock return is stronger if I use longer time periods, three and five 
years’ stock return. I got the following results with three years’ stock return and i) pre-crises 
data and ii) post-crisis data, respectively. 
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Table 13: Pay for performance regressions with three years’ stock return and pre-crisis 
data 
 
This table shows pre-crisis (2006-2009) pay for performance regressions with three years’ stock return as a 
performance measurement. Dependent variables are the following three variables: Total compensation is an annual 
total compensation paid to CEO. Cash compensation is a sum of annual salary and bonus. Salary is an annual 
fixed compensation. Independent variables are the following: ROA is a return on assets. Size is number of directors 
on board. Duality is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if CEO is also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. 
%Outsiders is a percentage of board of directors who are not employees of the company. %Aged is a percentage 
of board of directors who are older than 69 years old. Busy is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if at least 50% 
of board of directors serve on three or more other boards and 0 otherwise. %Related is a percentage of board of 
directors who have been employees of the company but currently are not. %Females is a percentage of board of 
directors who are female. Tenure is number of years the CEO has been CEO. %CEO Stocks is a stockholding of 
the CEO (%). Sales is an annual revenue. D/A is a total debt divided by total assets. M/B is a market value of the 
company divided by total assets. The regressions contain a set of 24 industry groups and 3 time dummies, from 
Variable Predicted sign Total Compensation Cash compensation Salary 
Performance variable
Stock return (3 years') + 28.60*** 6.15** -0.48
8.10 2.43 0.51
Corporate governance variables
Size + 454.30*** 85.97** 25.47***
100.05 41.59 5.70
Duality + 1250.32*** 199.60*** 127.85***
281.57 59.40 18.68
%Outsiders - 960.96 -744.97** -19.79
1142.29 309.11 88.37
%Aged + 118.37 78.57 91.75
997.25 244.65 64.56
Busy ? 1354.29 -84.88 -17.41
1510.44 262.56 118.59
%Related + 646.71 -23.42 7.60
1125.19 201.45 67.64
%Females - 606.29 235.90 98.06
1252.84 334.59 90.08
CEO charasteristic variables
Tenure (years) ? 0.12** 0.04*** 0.02***
0.06 0.01 0.004
%CEO stocks - -120.61*** -19.72 -13.88***
20.05 3.49 1.79
Company charasteristic variables
Sales ($ thousands) + 75.34*** 7.37** 3.37***
18.31 3.15 1.74
D/A ? 2609.67*** -13.52 194.70***
787.29 210.93 52.35
M/B + -184.92 113.80** -13.18
157.12 44.34 10.11
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 952 952 952
Adjusted r-squared 0.29 0.14 0.38
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2007 to 2009, with 2006 as a base year. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are heteroskedastic -robust standard errors. 
 
Table 14: Pay for performance regressions with three years’ stock return and post-crisis 
data  
 
This table shows post-crisis (2010-2013) pay for performance regressions with three years’ stock return as a 
performance measurement. Dependent variables are the following three variables: Total compensation is an annual 
total compensation paid to CEO. Cash compensation is a sum of annual salary and bonus. Salary is an annual 
fixed compensation. Independent variables are the following: ROA is a return on assets. Size is number of directors 
on board. Duality is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if CEO is also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. 
%Outsiders is a percentage of board of directors who are not employees of the company. %Aged is a percentage 
of board of directors who are older than 69 years old. Busy is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if at least 50% 
of board of directors serve on three or more other boards and 0 otherwise. %Related is a percentage of board of 
directors who have been employees of the company but currently are not. %Females is a percentage of board of 
directors who are female. Tenure is number of years the CEO has been CEO. %CEO Stocks is a stockholding of 
the CEO (%). Sales is an annual revenue. D/A is a total debt divided by total assets. M/B is a market value of the 
Variable Predicted sign Total Compensation Cash compensation Salary 
Performance variable
Stock return (3years') + 30.48*** 3.92** 0.79*
10.81 1.61 0.38
Corporate governance variables
Size + 552.93*** 103.31*** 35.75***
116.43 28.75 5.30
Duality + 841.43* 201.04*** 84.08***
477.14 50.05 15.69
%Outsiders - -577.92 -909.53*** 7.82
1527.94 268.68 86.72
%Aged + 1340.53* 512.06* 172.06***
788.50 288.60 43.65
Busy ? 1441.51 -135.86 138.71
1899.22 219.94 103.65
%Related + 1664.18** 324.16** 258.26***
754.33 139.97 63.79
%Females - -1561.60 -33.30 -27.79
1195.58 251.41 86.01
CEO charasteristic variables
Tenure (years) ? 0.08 0.04*** 0.03***
0.07 0.001 0.004
%CEO stocks - -243.87*** -29.57*** -21.65***
29.26 5.00 2.31
Company charasteristic variables
Sales ($ thousands) + 109.92*** 11.18*** 4.88***
34.83 1.42 0.53
D/A ? 4515.13*** 224.15* 238.16***
624.04 126.12 41.57
M/B + 554.31* -63.86*** -14.60*
312.26 23.50 7.72
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2247 2247 2247
Adjusted r-squared 0.16 0.19 0.34
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company divided by total assets. The regressions contain a set of 24 industry groups and 3 time dummies, from 
2011 to 2013, with 2010 as a base year. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are heteroskedastic -robust standard errors. 
 
Again, regarding of the second research question, these results are consistent with the previous 
results. Even though I use three years’ stock return, I still get similar kinds of results than the 
initial results presented in the table 10 and therefore, this offers more supportive evidence for 
my first and second hypotheses and for the strong link between corporate governance polies 
and pay for performance relationship. 
 
However, regarding of the third research question, results are again inconsistent. Contrary to 
the results with one year’s stock return, coefficients of stock returns are statistically significant 
in regressions with total compensation and with cash compensation, both pre- and post-crisis. 
Furthermore, contrary to results with ROA, those coefficients are about at the same level in pre-
crisis and post-crisis regressions. In other words, the pay for performance relationship between 
CEO’s total compensation and ROA has increased but the pay for performance relationship 
between different forms of compensation and stock return has not. Given that all three 
performance variables (ROA, one year’s stock return, three years’ stock return) have given 
different kinds of evidence, it is interesting to test what happen with five years’ stock return. 
Therefore, next tables present pay for performance regressions with five years’ stock return and 
i) pre-crisis data and ii) post-crisis data, respectively. 
 58 
Table 15: Pay for performance regressions with five years’ stock return and pre-crisis 
data 
 
This table shows pre-crisis (2006-2009) pay for performance regressions with five years’ stock return as a 
performance measurement. Dependent variables are the following three variables: Total compensation is an annual 
total compensation paid to CEO. Cash compensation is a sum of annual salary and bonus. Salary is an annual 
fixed compensation. Independent variables are the following: ROA is a return on assets. Size is number of directors 
on board. Duality is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if CEO is also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. 
%Outsiders is a percentage of board of directors who are not employees of the company. %Aged is a percentage 
of board of directors who are older than 69 years old. Busy is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if at least 50% 
of board of directors serve on three or more other boards and 0 otherwise. %Related is a percentage of board of 
directors who have been employees of the company but currently are not. %Females is a percentage of board of 
directors who are female. Tenure is number of years the CEO has been CEO. %CEO Stocks is a stockholding of 
the CEO (%). Sales is an annual revenue. D/A is a total debt divided by total assets. M/B is a market value of the 
company divided by total assets. The regressions contain a set of 24 industry groups and 3 time dummies, from 
Variable Predicted sign Total Compensation Cash compensation Salary 
Performance variable
Stock return (5 years') + 25.76*** 5.76** -0.76
9.73 2.25 0.50
Corporate governance variables
Size + 471.18*** 89.59** 25.19***
102.02 42.71 5.72
Duality + 1267.34*** 203.52*** 127.18***
285.57 59.93 18.72
%Outsiders - 863.50 -766.72** -17.00
1144.59 314.02 88.28
%Aged + -18.23 48.76 94.69
1008.52 245.04 64.35
Busy ? 1489.74 -56.40 -18.74
1512.86 260.04 118.41
%Related + 579.27 -37.49 8.12
1130.36 198.90 67.41
%Females - 644.33 246.27 94.23
1247.62 332.50 90.10
CEO charasteristic variables
Tenure (years) ? 0.12* 0.04*** 0.02***
0.06 0.01 0.004
%CEO stocks - -118.44*** -19.23*** -13.95***
20.09 3.50 1.78
Company charasteristic variables
Sales ($ thousands) + 75.79*** 7.45** 6.35***
18.48 3.14 1.73
D/A ? 2555.58*** -26.33 197.39***
799.91 213.81 52.48
M/B + -107.46 -98.65** -12.29
150.26 39.00 9.69
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 952 952 952
Adjusted r-squared 0.29 0.14 0.38
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2007 to 2009, with 2006 as a base year. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are heteroskedastic -robust standard errors. 
 
Table 16: Pay for performance regressions with five years’ stock return and post-crisis 
data  
 
This table shows post-crisis (2010-2013) pay for performance regressions with five years’ stock return as a 
performance measurement. Dependent variables are the following three variables: Total compensation is an annual 
total compensation paid to CEO. Cash compensation is a sum of annual salary and bonus. Salary is an annual 
fixed compensation. Independent variables are the following: ROA is a return on assets. Size is number of directors 
on board. Duality is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if CEO is also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. 
%Outsiders is a percentage of board of directors who are not employees of the company. %Aged is a percentage 
of board of directors who are older than 69 years old. Busy is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if at least 50% 
of board of directors serve on three or more other boards and 0 otherwise. %Related is a percentage of board of 
directors who have been employees of the company but currently are not. %Females is a percentage of board of 
directors who are female. Tenure is number of years the CEO has been CEO. %CEO Stocks is a stockholding of 
the CEO (%). Sales is an annual revenue. D/A is a total debt divided by total assets. M/B is a market value of the 
Variable Predicted sign Total Compensation Cash compensation Salary 
Performance variable
Stock return (5 years') + 55.04** 4.25** 1.31***
22.80 1.91 0.41
Corporate governance variables
Size + 541.41*** 102.37*** 35.48***
118.82 26.66 5.30
Duality + 829.68* 200.79*** 83.82***
481.27 50.18 15.76
%Outsiders - -470.85 -898.01*** 10.50
1498.97 267.39 86.83
%Aged + 1480.85* 521.56* 175.36
787.67 289.91 43.67
Busy ? 1399.06 -132.11 137.97
1908.39 219.64 103.35
%Related + 1752.41** 332.51** 260.42***
739.87 141.06 63.66
%Females - -1423.24 -32.17 -24.85
1198.72 253.40 85.79
CEO charasteristic variables
Tenure (years) ? 0.06 0.04*** 0.03***
0.08 0.01 0.003
%CEO stocks - -244.27*** -29.75*** -21.67***
29.74 5.02 2.32
Company charasteristic variables
Sales ($ thousands) + 109.91*** 11.17*** 4.89***
34.76 1.43 0.53
D/A ? 4287.60*** 215.41* 233.07***
631.65 125.00 41.58
M/B + 402.10 -64.35*** -17.81**
249.35 23.21 7.22
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2247 2247 2247
Adjusted r-squared 0.17 0.18 0.35
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company divided by total assets. The regressions contain a set of 24 industry groups and 3 time dummies, from 
2011 to 2013, with 2010 as a base year. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are heteroskedastic -robust standard errors. 
 
Again, regarding of the second research question, these results are consistent with the previous 
results. Even though I use five years’ stock return, I still get similar results presented in the 
table 10 and therefore, this offers more supportive evidence for my first and second hypotheses 
and for the strong link between corporate governance polies and pay for performance 
relationship. 
 
Interestingly, result regarding of the third research question are again inconsistent with all other 
results. In a regression with total compensation, the statistical significance has decreased 
slightly (it is significant at 1.6 % level) but economic significance has increased. Furthermore, 
in the regression with salary, the coefficient of stock return has become statistically more 
significant but economic significance has stayed quite small. In the cash compensation 
regression, both statistical and economic significance has stayed approximately at the same 
level. 
 
Conclusion from these robustness checks is that regarding of the second research question, 
results are consistent with the initial results presented in the table 10. Therefore, this paper 
offers some supportive evidence for the strong link between corporate governance policies and 
pay for performance relationship as more (less) effective corporate governance policies seem 
to cause smaller (larger) explanatory power in pay for performance regressions. However, even 
though this kind of link seem to exist, the evidence about level of pay for performance 
relationship is inconsistent as different measurements of performance give completely different 
results. Summary of the findings regarding of the third research question can be found from the 
table below. 
 
Table 17: Summary of pay for performance results 
 
This table summarizes my findings regarding of the third research question. Stronger (weaker) denotes that pay 
Total Compensation Cash compensation Salary 
ROA Stronger Weaker Same level
Stock return (1 year's) Not significant Not significant Not significant
Stock return (3 years') Same level Same level Not significant
Stock return (5 years') Unclear Same level Stronger
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for performance relationship with a given combination of performance measurement and form of compensation 
has become larger (smaller) after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Same level means no significant changes. Not 
significant means that the performance measurement is not statistically significant at five percent level (or at lower 
level). Unclear means that statistical and economic significance have changed to the opposite directions. 
 
As table 17 above presents, the evidence about change of level of pay for performance 
relationship is highly inconsistent. Therefore, answer to the third research question seems to be 
that the pay for performance relationship has not become stronger but the answer depends on 
performance measurement and form of compensation. There are many alternative explanations 
for the unchanged level of pay for performance relationship. First, it is quite likely that 
corporate governance policies have not become more effective, given that the decreased 
percentage of CEO-chair dualities is the only part of corporate governance policies that seem 
to have become more effective and many parts (size of the board, percentages of aged and 
related members) seem to have become less effective. Second, as described in the chapter 4, 
there seems to be the trade-off between stronger pay for performance relationship and more 
effective risk management, which is one focus area of the new legislation. Supportive 
arguments for the second explanation has offered e.g. by Kaplan (2013), who has argued that 
the pay for performance can be too strong (optimal level is not higher than current one) and too 
high equity-incentives were one reason behind the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
 
Given that results related to the third research question are inconsistent and strongly dependent 
on the variables, the last robustness check is to study if the results regarding of the second 
research question are consistent if I use slightly different variables. 
 
5.2.2 Models with alternative variables and discussion about limitations 
 
Even though I use variables that seem to be the most common ones and my adjusted r-squared 
are approximately at the same level than in previous studies, as most of regressions with total 
compensation have adjusted r-squared of approximately 0.3, which is quite similar than 0.37 
by Core et al. (1999), 0.35 by Fahlenbrach (2009) and 0.29 by Conyon and He (2011), I decided 
to test alternative models to make my result more robust. Given the scope of this paper, I only 
use alternative proxies presented in the third chapter to the total compensation, which is the 
main interest of this study. First, I test if results are different without the variable “%Females”, 
which was insignificant in my previous models (model 1 in the following two tables). Next, I 
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test alternative proxy for potential power of CEO, the age of CEO (model 2 in the following 
two tables). Third, I use the total assets instead of the sales as a proxy for size of company 
(model 3 in the following two tables). Fourth, I test a percentage of busy directors instead of 
the dummy variable for busy board (model 4 in the following two tables). Lastly, given that the 
fourth model gave different results, I tested the model four without females (model 5 in the 
following two tables), which has been insignificant in most of the models. The following two 
tables present my results with pre- and post-crisis data, respectively. 
 
Table 18: Pay for performance regressions with alternative control variables, ROA and 
the pre-crisis data 
 
This table shows pre-crisis (2006-2009) pay for performance regressions with alternative variables and ROA as a 
performance measurement. Dependent variable is the total compensation, an annual total compensation paid to 
Variable Predicted sign 1 2 3 4 5
Performance variable
ROA + 49.59*** 51.01*** 53.36*** 50.75*** 50.62***
15.47 15.35 15.87 15.04 15.06
Corporate governance variables
Size + 459.33*** 447.92*** 526.83*** 461.48*** 458.72***
101.79 103.70 104.73 103.53 102.11
Duality + 1205.42*** 1202.58*** 1280.37*** 1205.17*** 1205.11***
277.79 261.50 288.74 275.45 275.29
%Outsiders - 1145.72 973.43 1739.19 1256.25 1192.02
1088.39 1163.39 1128.75 1012.88 992.30
%Aged + 107.39 -292.37 -64.62 6.24 -51.06
984.08 1038.60 1027.97 977.37 951.15
Busy ? 1614.44 1503.79 2512.75**
1276.90 1521.69 1204.09
%Busy ? 2585.60** 2434.16**
1291.35 1061.11
%Related + 459.78 479.23 351.72 428.93 422.90
1104.60 1097.38 1191.01 1113.30 1108.68
%Females - 569.67 107.45 -391.88
1231.47 1177.07 1286.34
CEO charasteristic variables
Tenure (years) ? 0.13** 0.13** 0.13** 0.13**
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Age (years) ? 60.78**
24.53
%CEO stocks - -121.49*** -108.59*** -114.03*** -118.75*** -119.10***
19.38 19.22 19.11 19.57 19.40
Company charasteristic variables
Sales ($ thousands) + 74.00*** 72.16*** 71.71*** 71.88***
18.36 18.02 18.34 18.43
Total assets ($ thousands) + 3.37
2.99
D/A ? 2954.07*** 2906.45** 3232.69*** 2715.54*** 2706.77***
790.78 795.62 810.47 812.45 814.37
M/B + -133.80 -112.27 144.71 -141.81 -142.48
133.06 133.64 135.66 132.49 132.53
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 952 952 952 952 952
Adjusted r-squared 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.29 0.29
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CEO. Independent variables are the following. ROA is a return on assets. Size is number of directors on board. 
Duality is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if CEO is also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. %Outsiders 
is a percentage of board of directors who are not employees of the company. %Aged is a percentage of board of 
directors who are older than 69 years old. Busy is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if at least 50% of board 
of directors serve on three or more other boards and 0 otherwise. %Busy is a percentage of board of directors who 
serve on three or more other boards. %Related is a percentage of board of directors who have been employees of 
the company but currently are not. %Females is a percentage of board of directors who are female. Tenure is 
number of years the CEO has been CEO. Age is the age of the CEO in years. %CEO Stocks is a stockholding of 
the CEO (%). Sales is an annual revenue. Total assets are a total amount of assets owned by the company, as 
reported in annual report. D/A is a total debt divided by total assets. M/B is a market value of the company divided 
by total assets.  The regressions contain a set of 24 industry groups and 3 time dummies, from 2007 to 2009, with 
2006 as a base year. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard 
errors are heteroskedastic -robust standard errors. 
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Table 19: Pay for performance regressions with alternative control variables, ROA and 
the post-crisis data 
 
This table shows post-crisis (2010-2013) pay for performance regressions with alternative variables and ROA as 
a performance measurement. Dependent variable is the total compensation, the annual total compensation paid to 
CEO. Independent variables are the following. ROA is a return on assets. Size is number of directors on board. 
Duality is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if CEO is also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. %Outsiders 
is a percentage of board of directors who are not employees of the company. %Aged is a percentage of board of 
directors who are older than 69 years old. Busy is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if at least 50% of board 
of directors serve on three or more other boards and 0 otherwise. %Busy is a percentage of board of directors who 
serve on three or more other boards. %Related is a percentage of board of directors who have been employees of 
the company but currently are not. %Females is a percentage of board of directors who are female. Tenure is 
number of years the CEO has been CEO. Age is the age of the CEO in years. %CEO Stocks is a stockholding of 
the CEO (%). Sales is an annual revenue. Total assets are a total amount of assets owned by the company, as 
Variable Predicted sign 1 2 3 4 5
Performance variable
ROA + 78.05*** 78.69*** 100.55*** 78.24*** 77.53***
29.49 29.49 36.96 29.64 29.57
Corporate governance variables
Size + 513.79*** 523.98*** 702.54*** 539.69*** 524.44***
120.09 121.96 94.90 115.86 115.06
Duality + 811.33* 896.64* 1178.84*** 827.30* 830.59*
485.37 519.47 406.96 471.15 471.25
%Outsiders - -856.10 -483.15 -31.42 510.51 70.93
1488.8 1482.96 1391.96 1253.90 1289.53
%Aged + 1341.04* 1361.11* 1129.89 985.52 1066.31
787.20 785.93 799.46 795.88 799.70
Busy ? 954.35 1563.70 3203.74**
1848.08 1393.81
%Busy ? 3763.83*** 2959.49**
1307.39 1227.00
%Related + 1523.29** 1603.27** 1026.92 1649.02** 1514.48**
744.21 745.86 888.71 729.79 732.73
%Females - -1962.21* -1204.67 -2761.75**
1176.46 1181.20 1119.46
CEO charasteristic variables
Tenure (years) ? 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10
0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Age (years) ? 8.45
19.87
%CEO stocks - -235.20*** -218.04*** -225.26*** -231.51*** -228.65***
28.26 28.94 27.16 28.29 28.03
Company charasteristic variables
Sales ($ thousands) + 107.52*** 107.74*** 105.65*** 105.30***
34.10 34.26 34.03 33.95
Total assets ($ thousands) + 8.44***
2.58
D/A ? 5201.81*** 5185.94*** 6384.47*** 4942.41*** 4900.48***
672.21 682.04 880.32 667.03 666.33
M/B + 541.91* 539.38* 497.88* 528.07** 533.80*
300.55 297.42 296.80 297.41 297.55
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2247 2247 2247 2247 2247
Adjusted r-squared 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.17
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reported in annual report. D/A is a total debt divided by total assets. M/B is a market value of the company divided 
by total assets. The regressions contain a set of 24 industry groups and 3 time dummies, from 2007 to 2009, with 
2006 as a base year. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard 
errors are heteroskedastic -robust standard errors. 
 
Regarding of the second research question, these results are quite consistent with the previous 
results as the “Size” has become more significant and “Duality” and percentages of related and 
aged members have become less significant. However, there are some new and interesting 
findings about corporate governance policies. First, the percentage of busy directors seems to 
be more significant than the dummy variable for busy board, indicating that the first one might 
be more appropriate proxy for the urgency of board. Fortunately, this does not have significant 
effects to the results in general, as there are only two differences. First, the significance of 
percentages of aged members drops from slightly above ten percent level to slightly below that 
level. However, the significance level has still increased after the financial crisis of 2007-2008, 
so these results are still quite consistent with the other results. 
 
The second difference is more interesting and significant. One can see from the tables above 
that if I use percentage of busy members instead of the dummy variable for busy board, the 
percentage of female board members becomes significantly negative at five percent level 
(model four). This raises some questions: Which one is a more appropriate control variable for 
the urgency of board members? Why different proxies for the urgency of board members do 
not have significant effects to the other variables but do make percentage of female board 
members statistically significant? Because these kinds of questions are outside of the scope of 
this study, I only quickly tested if different proxy for the urgency of board members affects to 
my results in general by doing my analysis presented in the fourth and fifth chapters with the 
variable “%Busy” instead of “Busy”. Results in general were consistent with the initial results 
presented in the table 10 but the significance of female board members was unclear because 
when I took one form of compensation and one proxy for the performance, the percentage of 
female board member became statistically significant in some models but not in all models. 
Based on that, it would be interesting to see further study about the effect of females from a pay 
for performance point of view.  
 
To conclude this last robustness check, it seems that my results regarding of the second research 
question are quite robust. However, given the unclear effect of female board member, it would 
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be interesting to see some further studies about significance of female members from a pay for 
performance point of view. Moreover, the pay for performance relationship seem to have 
become stronger with ROA and total compensation, even though other variables give 
inconsistent results. Lastly, the adjusted r-square seem to stay at approximately same level than 
in the previous studies. 
 
Even though most of my results seem to be quite a robust, there are always some limitations 
that should be considered. With regression analysis, a choice of variables is often the most 
significant challenge. This is a particularly considerable issue in this paper because there are 
large number of alternative control variables that some papers have used. Probably the most 
important variables that I do not use are control variables for the stockholdings. For example, 
on the one hand, one could argue that I should control stockholding of inside members (or 
related members) because if they have more equity incentives, they could monitor CEO more 
closely. On the other hand, Core et al. (1999) found that proxy variable for this seem to be 
insignificant and Adams and Ferreira (2007) have pointed out that it may make sense to not 
monitor CEO too closely. This is because then a CEO may be reluctant to share all information 
with the board, because he or she knows that with more information, board members can 
monitor him or her more easily.  
 
Furthermore, the true effect of stakeholders’ equity incentives is questionable from a pay for 
performance point of view. For example, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) have argued that if one 
wants to improve corporate governance policies, one should focus on stock ownership of the 
board of directors but I argue that from the pay for performance point of view, the true effect 
of equity incentives might be relatively small. For example, if a board member holds 1% of the 
company and manages to decrease CEO’s compensation by 100.000 dollars, he or she “gains” 
100 dollars (minus taxes). However, negative effects might be multiple, as the social tie with 
CEO is likely to become negative instead of positive and CEO may not want to share all 
information. Therefore, one could argue that the stock holdings of insider members or board 
members in general, is not a significant issue from the pay for performance point of view. 
 
Similar kind of discussion applies also for the stockholdings of large shareholders (a common 
limit is >5%). On the one hand, one could argue that I should control the stock ownership of 
large stockholders because according to principal agent theory, large shareholders have more 
incentives to monitor CEO. On the other hand, one could argue that this is not a significant 
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issue from the pay for performance point of view, based on similar kinds of argument than with 
stockholdings of board members. From a large shareholder point of view, compensation 
policies seem irrelevant in comparison to other policies, such as investment management, R&D, 
cost control, or even the dividend policy (timing of cash flow can be important for the large 
shareholders). Therefore, I argue that large shareholders have incentives to monitor CEO and 
business in general but not the compensation policies. Supportive evidence for this theory have 
found e.g. by Core et al. (1999) who have found that variable for large shareholders tends to be 
statistically insignificant.  
 
In addition to stockholding variables, there could be some other significant control variables 
that I do not use. For example, attention rate of board meetings could be an important issue 
because the governance report made by OECD (2009) argues that the information is a one key 
issue for successful board membership and without the attention on the board meetings, it is 
difficult to get all the information (Kirkpatrick 2009). In addition, Federal Reserve System have 
argued that board members should participate in the board meetings (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City 2010). However, it is not easy to get appropriate data to build some proxy variable 
for this, so unfortunately, I cannot test if this variable would change my results. So as one can 
see, there are many variables, which I could have tested if I had more data. However, other 
researches have faced similar kinds of challenges and used quite similar variables than I do, so 
I argue that the omitted variable bias is not that critical problem in this paper. 
 
Other limitations could be caused by inappropriate research method or by biased data collecting 
process. Given that I follow prior literature, which have mostly used linear regression models 
and OLS-fitting, the first one is unlikely problem. Moreover, I use similar kinds of databased 
than other studies have used. Therefore, data-related limitations are mainly related to the 
generalization of results. First, many prior papers used only large companies (such as S&P500 
or FTSE350 companies), which make my results less comparable with these papers, because I 
use also smaller companies to get a large enough data set for the pre-crisis data set. Related to 
the number of observations, one could argue that my pre-crisis data set of 952 observations is 
still too small in comparison to post-crisis data set of 2247 observations. However, I argue that 
 68 
952 observations are enough to make statistical analysis and therefore, there should not be any 
problems related to this.  
 
The last significant limitation is related to generalization of my results. Geographical 
generalization cannot be made because different laws, economic growth levels, cultural 
differences, taxes etc. can all effect to the corporate governance policies and pay for 
performance relationship. However, this challenge exists in every paper so a more significant 
question is the similarity of circumstances between my pre- and post-crisis datasets. More 
closely, the economic environment is not similar pre-and post-crisis, so one could argue that 
this might cause some biases to my results. For example, the average three years’ stock return 
is 0.5% in pre-crisis data (because the stock market large crash is included to this data set) and 
13.2% in post-crisis data. However, I argue that this is not a significant problem because other 
performance variables are approximately at the same level. Furthermore, if one is analyzing the 
effect of some change (e.g. financial crisis of 2007-2008) one cannot have exactly similar 
circumstances. 
 
Therefore, to conclude discussion about the limitations, I argue that my research methods and 
data are appropriate but as always, there are some limitations to consider. First, some additional 
variables could have used if I had had more data. Second, more research need to be done before 
any geographical generalization. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
After the financial crisis of 2007-2008, corporate governance policies have got a large amount 
of public attention, there have been new legislations related to it and according to some 
researches (e.g. Murphy 2012, Kaplan 2013), companies have taken more effective corporate 
governance policies. Furthermore, many researchers have found a significant link between 
corporate governance policies and pay for performance relationship. Therefore, all this offers 
an interesting opportunity to find new evidence about i) the current state of corporate 
governance policies ii) the level of pay for performance relationship and iii) the alleged strong 
link between these two issues. 
 
Regarding of the current state of corporate governance policies, I found that companies have 
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taken slightly different corporate governance policies after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
However, most parts of the corporate governance policies seem to have become less effective 
after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. However, even though many parts of corporate 
governance policies have become less consistent with academic findings about effective 
corporate governance policies, this does not necessarily mean less effective corporate 
governance policies, as there are many alternative explanations for this phenomenon. Adams et 
al. (2010) have highlighted that there is at least some possibility that some corporate governance 
policies, which are inconsistent with academic findings, may be appropriate choices for some 
companies. One good example is the size of the board: even though most researchers have 
found that the size of board should be relatively small, Coles et al. (2008) have argued that 
simple firms should have small boards and complex firms should have large board, so one size 
does not fit for all. Therefore, I can say that after the financial crisis of 2007-2008, companies 
have taken corporate governance policies, which are slightly less consistent with academic 
findings and based on that, seem to be less effective. This means that the first hypothesis is not 
rejected. However, there is a possibility that for different companies, different kinds of 
corporate governance policies are effective and it would be interesting to see some further 
studies about the performance of companies with different kinds of corporate governance 
policies. In addition, it would be interesting to know reasons behind these changes of corporate 
governance policies, especially because most of the changes seem to be against the academic 
findings. 
 
The second interest of this paper is the alleged strong link between corporate governance 
policies and pay for performance relationship. I found supportive evidence for this link, as it 
seems that more (less) effective corporate governance policies means less (more) significant 
coefficients for these variables in pay for performance regressions. In other words, when there 
are smaller number of companies with ineffective corporate governance policies, the 
explanatory power of corporate governance policies decreases, as it theoretically should. 
Interestingly, the link seems to exist but unexpectedly, companies seem to have mainly taken 
less effective corporate governance policies, causing mainly more significant coefficients. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis is not rejected. These results were robust with all models. 
 
The third interest of this paper is the level of pay for performance relationship after the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008. Based on my main performance measurement, ROA, and CEO’s total 
compensation, the pay for performance relationship seem to have become stronger. However, 
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this result is highly depended on performance measurement and form of compensation. With 
different variables, results are completely inconsistent and based on this, the third hypothesis is 
not rejected. Therefore, it would be interesting to see more research about the pay for 
performance relationship after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and especially, about reasons 
behind the inconsistent results with different performance measurements. These kinds of 
studies could help to understand if one reason for unchanged level of pay for performance 
relationship is the trade-off between stronger pay for performance relationship and better risk 
management, which is one focus area of the new legislation.   
 
To summarize, my key findings are the following issues. First, it seems that companies have 
taken slightly different corporate governance policies after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
Interestingly, most of the changes are against academic findings about effective corporate 
governance policies. Given that some parts seem to have become more effective and some less 
effective, I cannot say which one of my cases (a-h on pages 21-23) is the most appropriate 
description of current state of corporate governance policies in general. Second, the strong link 
between corporate governance policies and pay for performance relationship seem to exist as 
more (less) effective corporate governance policies seem to be linked with less (more) 
significant coefficients in pay for performance regressions. Third, the pay for performance 
relationship has become stronger between ROA and CEO’s total compensation but not between 
ROA and other form of compensation or between stock return and any forms of compensation. 
One potential reason behind inconsistent results between short- medium- and long-term 
performance measurements could be the new legislation, which highlights importance of risk 
management and tries to mitigate short-term risk taking. 
 
Given these inconsistent results, it would be interesting to see some further studies about the 
pay for performance relationship. First, it would be interesting to study the effect of female 
board members as I got inconclusive results. Second, more robustness check could be done for 
example with additional variables, new countries, more recent data and with different sized 
companies. Third, it would be interesting to try to separate a luck and skill parts of pay for 
performance relationship, for example by using Kim’s (2010) methods. Lastly, it would be 
interesting to study reasons behind the differences of pay for performance relationship with 
alternative performance measurement and different forms of compensation. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Mathematical proof for the decreasing significance of the coefficient, given 
the decreasing variance of the variable  
An independent variable can have a large amount of explanatory power in a regression model 
only if the variance of the variable (Xi) is relatively large (i.e. distribution is relatively wide). 
This is because a smaller variance of the independent variable (Xi) means a larger variance for 
the coefficient of that variable (Bi), which means higher p-value for this variable. 
Mathematically, this is true because in regression model with the most common approach called 
the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) fitting, the variance of the coefficient (Bi) is calculated based 
on the following formula: 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝛽𝑖 − 𝐵𝑖) =
1
𝑛
∗
𝑣𝑎𝑟{(𝑋𝑖 − 𝜇𝑥)𝜇𝑖}
(𝜎𝑥2)2
 
 
where  
 = estimated coefficient 
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B = true value of coefficient  
n = sample size,  
Xi = estimated value Xi 
x = estimated mean of the variable X 
i = mean of the error term  
σx = standard deviation of the X variable 
 
and the p-value of the coefficient is calculated based on the following formula:  
 
p = 1 − ∅ (
Y̅−μ,0
Sy
√n
), 
where 
p = p-value 
∅ = z-value from the cumulative normal distribution table 
Y̅ = estimated mean of the variable 
 μY,0 = value of zero hypothesis (often zero) 
Sy = sample standard error of the variable 
n = sample size 
 
Based on these two formulas, one can see that smaller variance of the independent variable 
(Xi) means higher variance for the coefficient (Bi) of this variable, which means higher p-
value i.e. lower statistical significance of this variable 
2. Industry groups 
 
Industry name 
Industry 
group 
Coal & Consumable Fuels 1010 
Integrated Oil & Gas 1010 
Oil & Gas Drilling 1010 
Oil & Gas Equipment & Services 1010 
Oil & Gas Exploration & Production 1010 
Oil & Gas Refining & Marketing 1010 
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Oil & Gas Storage & Transportation 1010 
Aluminum 1510 
Commodity Chemicals 1510 
Construction Materials 1510 
Diversified Chemicals 1510 
Diversified Metals & Mining 1510 
Fertilizers & Agricultural Chemicals 1510 
Forest Products 1510 
Industrial Gases 1510 
Metal & Glass Containers 1510 
Paper Packaging 1510 
Paper Products 1510 
Silver 1510 
Specialty Chemicals 1510 
Steel 1510 
Aerospace & Defense 2010 
Agricultural & Farm Machinery 2010 
Building Products 2010 
Construction & Engineering 2010 
Construction Machinery & Heavy Trucks 2010 
Electrical Components & Equipment 2010 
Industrial Conglomerates 2010 
Industrial Machinery 2010 
Trading Companies & Distributors 2010 
Commercial Printing 2020 
Diversified Support Services 2020 
Environmental & Facilities Services 2020 
Human Resource & Employment Services 2020 
Office Services & Supplies 2020 
Research & Consulting Services 2020 
Security & Alarm Services 2020 
Air Freight & Logistics 2030 
Airlines 2030 
Railroads 2030 
Trucking 2030 
Auto Parts & Equipment 2510 
Tires & Rubber 2510 
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Apparel, Accessories & Luxury Goods 2520 
Consumer Electronics 2520 
Footwear 2520 
Home Furnishings 2520 
Homebuilding 2520 
Household Appliances 2520 
Housewares & Specialties 2520 
Leisure Products 2520 
Photographic Products -- Discontinued 
effective 02 
2520 
Casinos & Gaming 2530 
Education Services 2530 
Hotels, Resorts & Cruise Lines 2530 
Restaurants 2530 
Specialized Consumer Services 2530 
Advertising 2540 
Broadcasting 2540 
Cable & Satellite 2540 
Movies & Entertainment 2540 
Publishing 2540 
Apparel Retail 2550 
Automotive Retail 2550 
Catalog Retail 2550 
Computer & Electronics Retail 2550 
Department Stores 2550 
Distributors 2550 
General Merchandise Stores 2550 
Home Improvement Retail 2550 
Home furnishing Retail 2550 
Internet Retail 2550 
Specialty Stores 2550 
Drug Retail 3010 
Food Distributors 3010 
Food Retail 3010 
Hypermarkets & Super Centers 3010 
Agricultural Products 3020 
Brewers 3020 
Distillers & Vintners 3020 
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Packaged Foods & Meats 3020 
Soft Drinks 3020 
Tobacco 3020 
Household Products 3030 
Personal Products 3030 
Health Care Distributors 3510 
Health Care Equipment 3510 
Health Care Facilities 3510 
Health Care Services 3510 
Health Care Supplies 3510 
Health Care Technology 3510 
Managed Health Care 3510 
Biotechnology 3520 
Life Sciences Tools & Services 3520 
Pharmaceuticals 3520 
Diversified Banks 4010 
Regional Banks 4010 
Thrifts & Mortgage Finance 4010 
Asset Management & Custody Banks 4020 
Consumer Finance 4020 
Investment Banking & Brokerage 4020 
Multi-Sector Holdings 4020 
Specialized Finance 4020 
Insurance Brokers 4030 
Life & Health Insurance 4030 
Multi-line Insurance 4030 
Property & Casualty Insurance 4030 
Reinsurance 4030 
Diversified REITs 4040 
Health Care REIT's 4040 
Hotel & Resort REIT's 4040 
Industrial REITs 4040 
Mortgage REITs 4040 
Office REITs 4040 
Real Estate Development 4040 
Real Estate Services 4040 
Residential REITs 4040 
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Retail REITs 4040 
Specialized REITs 4040 
Application Software 4510 
Data Processing & Outsourced Services 4510 
Home Entertainment Software 4510 
Internet Software & Services 4510 
IT Consulting & Other Services 4510 
Systems Software 4510 
Communications Equipment 4520 
Computer Storage & Peripherals - 
Discontinued 
4520 
Electronic Components 4520 
Electronic Equipment & Instruments 4520 
Electronic Manufacturing Services 4520 
Technology Distributors 4520 
Technology Hardware, Storage & Peripherals 4520 
Semiconductor Equipment 4530 
Semiconductors 4530 
Alternative Carriers 5010 
Integrated Telecommunication Services 5010 
Electric Utilities 5510 
Gas Utilities 5510 
Independent Power Producers & Energy 
Traders 
5510 
Multi-Utilities 5510 
Water Utilities 5510 
 
 
 
 
